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Reviews of Papua New Guinea and 
West Papua are not included in this 
issue.
Fiji
By January 2006 the confl ict between 
the Fiji Military Forces and the now 
ousted government, which had been 
led by the Soqosoqo Duavata ni 
Lewenivanua (sdl) party, had been 
continuing for almost fi ve years. One 
of the main criticisms put forth by 
the commander of the Fiji Military 
Forces, Commodore Voreqe Baini-
marama, was that Laisenia Qarase’s 
government was lax in dealing with 
the 2000 coup perpetrators. A number 
of high chiefs were allowed to serve 
their prison terms extramurally, and 
one chiefl y parliamentarian returned 
to Parliament after his sentence. This 
confl ict was later compounded by the 
introduction of the Reconciliation and 
Unity Bill by the sdl government. The 
bill was aimed at reconciling the per-
petrators and victims of the 2000 coup 
led by George Speight. Commodore 
Bainimarama, who was also a victim 
of that coup through the November 
2000 mutiny, along with other critics, 
detested the introduction of this bill. 
They believed that if passed, the bill 
would serve as a green light for future 
coup perpetrators in Fiji.
sdl government leaders did little 
to allay this fear. They simply kept 
on with the tasks of leadership based 
on their constitutional roles. They 
understood that the government and 
the various institutions of the state, 
including the military, had specifi c 
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functions to perform as stipulated in 
Fiji’s 1997 Constitution. Perhaps the 
sdl government assumed too much 
about people’s acceptance of the 
rule of law in a developing country 
or Third World context. As can be 
gauged from Fiji’s coup culture since 
1987, the causes of political confl ict 
in the country extend far beyond the 
scope of the modern rule of law, and 
solutions involve additional political, 
legal, and even customary measures. 
Perhaps continued dialogue between 
the sdl government and the Fiji 
Military Forces outside the param-
eters of Parliament could partially 
have resolved Fiji’s ongoing political 
crisis. After all, 95 percent of both the 
sdl government and the Fiji Military 
Forces were indigenous Fijians. During 
2006, the commander’s public com-
ments about the sdl government were 
sometimes perceived as seditious and 
treasonous, but the government did 
not really take concrete steps to rectify 
the situation. The February 2006 issue 
of Fiji Islands Business noted, “In any 
other democratic country, and Fiji is 
(or was) basically one, Mr. Bainima-
rama’s stance would have promptly 
caused his dismissal. The magazine 
went on to say that Bainimarama’s 
behavior has gone beyond the usually 
accepted state of affairs in a democ-
racy, wherein the military is subservi-
ent to civilian rule (FIB, Feb 2006, 9).
In addition to the continuing politi-
cal tussle between the commodore 
and Prime Minister Qarase, Fiji’s 
economy was not in perfect health. 
As early as March 2006, the Reserve 
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Bank warned that high internal 
consumption rates could no longer be 
sustained by depressed exports and 
high oil prices. By the end of 2005, 
Fiji’s export stood at f$1.18 billion, 
and total imports at f$2.72 billion 
(f$1.00 averaged approximately 
us$0.58 throughout the year). At the 
same time the trade defi cit increased to 
f$1.53 billion. By the end of February 
2006, the interest rate had increased 
from 2.25 percent to 3.25 percent. 
Fiji’s foreign reserve fi gure, which 
stood at f$991 million in mid-2005, 
had decreased to f$822 million by 
December 2005. Governor of the 
Reserve Bank of Fiji Savenaca Narube 
warned that the only way to improve 
Fiji’s deteriorating economic situa-
tion was to raise the level of exports 
and investments (FIB, March 2006, 6). 
Concerned about economic survival 
and meeting regional and interna-
tional trade challenges, the Fiji textile, 
clothing, and footwear (tcf) industry, 
proposed a reduction in the local area 
content as required under the rules of 
origin regulations of the South Pacifi c 
Regional Trade and Economic Coop-
eration Agreement (sparteca). This 
regional trade agreement, signed in 
1981 by Australia, New Zealand, and 
the Pacifi c Islands Forum countries, 
allows products to enter Australia and 
New Zealand duty free, provided that 
50 percent of the raw materials used 
are produced locally (FIB, April 2006, 
6). This move was vigorously opposed 
by the Textile and Fashion Industry 
of Australia (tfia), which argued that 
reducing the rules of origin would 
result in long-term harm to the Aus-
tralian tcf industry (FIB, March 2006, 
5). However, the Fiji tcf industry, 
through Ramesh Solanki, argued 
that the sparteca-tcf provision of 
50 percent local content was a trade 
barrier. He argued that reducing the 
local content from 50 percent to 30 
percent would facilitate trade and was 
in no way a threat to Australia’s tcf 
industry, especially when customers in 
Australia selected fabrics and garment 
patterns. He added that the fabrics 
chosen were often either too expensive 
or did not qualify under the rules of 
origin. Reducing the rules of origin 
would enable the Fiji tcf industry to 
import fabrics from other countries 
and give the customers more choice. 
Orders diverted to Asia because of the 
rules of origin could be returned to 
Fiji. An additional challenge to Fiji’s 
f$200 million tcf industry is the low-
ering of Australia’s import duty from 
55 percent in 1981 to the current 17.5 
percent, making it cheaper for other 
garment-producing countries to export 
their products to Australia (FIB, April 
2006, 6).
General elections dominated the 
political agenda in the fi rst four 
months of 2006. In April, Fiji’s voting-
age citizens went to the polls to elect 
71 members to the House of Repre-
sentatives for the next fi ve years. Since 
1999, Fiji has utilized the Alternative 
Vote system, borrowed from Austra-
lia. Fiji’s electoral system is based on 
ethnic politics, which makes it quite 
complex. Voters are grouped together 
as Fijian, Indian, or General Vot-
ers—that is, individuals who are not 
registered as Fijian or Indian. There 
are 46 Communal seats where people 
vote for representatives of their own 
ethnic categories (Fijian, Indian, or 
General), and 25 Open seats, which 
are contested without reference to 
ethnicity. The Open seats, introduced 
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for the fi rst time in the 1999 elections, 
aim to promote multiracialism. Fiji’s 
1997 constitution also requires that 
all parties with more than 10 percent 
of seats in Parliament be invited by 
the winning party to join a multiparty 
cabinet. Given the ethnic nature of 
Fiji’s politics, this was the foremost 
challenge for the winning party in the 
2006 general elections. Although eight 
political parties plus Independent  can-
didates participated in the 2006 elec-
tions, two political parties dominated 
the competition for parliamentary 
seats. These were the Fijian-dominated 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua 
(sdl) party, and the Indian-dominated 
Fiji Labour Party (flp).
The sdl party, led by Laisenia 
Qarase, won the 2006 general elec-
tions for a second fi ve-year term, with 
all 23 Fijian Communal and Fijian 
Urban seats, and 13 of the 25 Open 
seats; the Fiji Labour Party won all 
19 Indian Communal and 12 of the 
Open seats. The remaining 4 seats 
were taken by two Independent candi-
dates and two members of the United 
People’s Party (Fiji Elections Offi ce 
2006). The 2006 election results con-
fi rmed a number of voting trends in 
Fiji. Voting was ethnically oriented in 
both Communal and Open seats. The 
two parties won all of their respective 
Communal seats; of the Open seats, 
the sdl party won in constituencies 
with a majority of Fijian voters and 
the Fiji Labour Party won in con-
stituencies with a majority of Indian 
voters. Multiracial politics may take 
a while to gain acceptance across the 
ethnic divide.
In the spirit of promoting multi-
racial politics in Fiji, the sdl gov-
ernment appeared to be serious and 
committed when it offered eight 
cabinet seats to the Fiji Labour Party. 
While Mahendra Chaudhary as leader 
of the Fiji Labour Party declined to be 
a member of the cabinet, eight of his 
parliamentarians accepted the offer. 
However, since the constitution does 
not specify the “rules of engagement” 
for a multiparty cabinet, it was a 
testing time for the new government. 
In the cabinet, members of the Fiji 
Labour Party were unsure whether 
they had to abide by sdl terms and 
conditions, or whether they were 
answerable to flp leader Chaudhary. 
During the vote for the 2007 bud-
get in November 2006, a number of 
flp cabinet ministers were away on 
overseas engagements and so could 
not vote. The leader of the Fiji Labour 
Party asserted that this scheduling was 
a deliberate ploy by the leader of the 
sdl party to enable the passage of his 
government’s budget. Whether such 
political incidents were foreseen by the 
architects of the 1997 constitution is 
not clear.
Public sector reform continued to 
be a major issue confronting the sdl 
government after its election vic-
tory. The large size of the civil service 
has been on the reform agenda since 
1984–1985, when a World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund 
country mission recommended that 
the government be restructured. A 
wage freeze had immediately been 
implemented, and a debate about civil 
service downsizing had commenced. 
But over the years, through four coups 
and much political maneuvering, the 
size of the civil service has actually 
increased. Since the fi rst coup in 1987, 
Fijian political leaders have increased 
the size of government to secure their 
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power bases and political support. The 
now ousted sdl government employed 
cabinet ministers as well as state 
ministers, which added to the cost of 
government.
There was a little light at the 
end of the economic tunnel after 
the November 2006 Pacifi c Islands 
Forum Meeting, when Fiji, along 
with Vanuatu, Sämoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
and Kiribati, successfully negotiated 
a temporary labor migration scheme 
with New Zealand. The much-wel-
comed New Zealand scheme will 
offer seven-month temporary work 
visas to fi ve thousand workers from 
these six countries. Australia, on the 
other hand, refused to implement such 
schemes but offered other alternatives 
such as building technical colleges in 
the islands (IB, Nov 2006, 20). These 
colleges would enable Islanders to 
earn trade certifi cates, which would 
qualify them to apply for skilled work 
in Australia and New Zealand.
The issue dominating Fiji’s politi-
cal landscape throughout 2006 was 
the escalating war of words between 
Qarase’s sdl government and the 
Commander Bainimarama of the Fiji 
Military Forces. The challenges to 
the sdl government by Bainimarama 
paused for a while after the elections, 
but reemerged and intensifi ed toward 
the end of 2006. Apart from the 
ongoing debate about the aftermath 
of the 2000 George Speight coup, two 
measures that angered the commander 
were the Reconciliation, Tolerance and 
Unity Bill and the Qoliqoli Bill, which, 
if passed, would have given customary 
users ownership of qoliqoli or tradi-
tional fi shing grounds. By November 
2006, the debate had escalated. After 
the sdl government attempted to 
sack him while he was overseas, the 
commander threatened a “clean-up” 
of government. This attempt failed 
when the offi cer who was nominated 
to be the new commander preferred 
to be appointed after the com-
mander returned to Fiji. A number 
of institutions, including the Bose 
Levu Vakaturaga or Great Council of 
Chiefs, expressed concern about the 
escalating tensions.
After its meeting on 10 November 
2006, the Great Council of Chiefs 
established a reconciliation commit-
tee to attempt to mediate between 
the government and the military. The 
committee consisted of high chiefs 
from various traditional matanitu 
or confederacies, as well as a legal 
adviser, a political adviser, and a 
psychologist. Talks were initiated and 
a few meetings convened, but by that 
time relations had deteriorated too 
far. A further attempt at reconcilia-
tion was undertaken by New Zealand 
Prime Minister Helen Clarke, also 
in November 2006. However, these 
reconciliation attempts were unable to 
avert the coup, which occurred on 5 
December 2006.
Fiji is again in the doldrums after 
the execution of the December coup, 
the fourth since 1987. International 
sanctions have been imposed by coun-
tries such as Australia, New Zealand, 
and the United Kingdom, and mem-
bers of the military, their families, and 
coup supporters are unable to travel 
to these countries. The military regime 
has, in turn, imposed its own travel 
bans on critics of the coup. Against 
a backdrop of increasing economic 
instability, Fiji is faced with long-term 
sociopolitical and economic problems. 
Recent events have once again high-
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lighted the complexity and precari-
ousness of Fiji’s democracy and rule 
of law, which are based on compet-
ing traditional and modern political 
interests. Perhaps the biggest challenge 
for future governments is how to get 
rid of an established coup culture and 
a subculture that offers immunity after 
the execution of coups.
alumita l durutalo
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New Caledonia
The approaching French legislative 
and presidential elections of 2007 
amplifi ed political rhetoric and maneu-
vering in New Caledonia in 2006 over 
issues such as the freezing of the elec-
torate for future provincial elections, 
tensions within the coalitions that had 
signed the Noumea Accord of 1998, 
multinational takeovers and environ-
mental protests over mining develop-
ment, social and economic reforms, 
emergence as a quasi-autonomous 
Pacifi c country in regional affairs, and 
paralyzing labor strikes, which, at 
times, had political overtones. Ongo-
ing situational cooperation between 
the loyalist Avenir Ensemble (ae) and 
elements of the pro-independence 
Front de Libération Nationale Kanak 
et Socialiste (flnks), and sometimes 
even the local branch of the archcon-
servative Front National (fn), enabled 
the country to continue its progress 
toward self-governance. But the once-
dominant loyalist Rassemblement 
pour la Calédonie dans la République 
(rpcr), in league with loyalist voters 
associations and the fn, became more 
militant about protecting universal 
suffrage and ties with France.
In elections for the French president 
or legislature, municipal elections, or 
European Union elections, any French 
citizen in the country can vote, but 
the Noumea Accord endorsed restrict-
ing the local electorate in provincial 
elections and in referendums on 
independence to long-term residents. 
The flnks argues that the indigenous 
Kanak people were deprived of the 
right to vote for a century by French 
colonialism (from 1853 to the early 
1950s), even though international 
law has recognized their right, as 
the fi rst occupants of the country, to 
self-determination. They say that in 
negotiations in 1983 (Nainville-Les-
Roches), 1988 (Matignon-Oudinot), 
and 1998 (Paris-Noumea), Kanak 
leaders made concessions to immi-
grants of long residence (whom they 
regard as fellow victims of history) by 
agreeing to work together toward a 
common destiny, but that the commit-
ment in those agreements to restricting 
who can determine the future status 
of the country must be respected. Few 
residents object to having the restric-
tion apply to future referendums, and 
in the provincial elections in 1999 and 
2004, a “sliding” electorate (anyone 
with ten years’ residence) has applied. 
But because the Congress will have 
the right, according to the Noumea 
Accord, to propose a referendum on 
independence between 2013 and 2018, 
the flnks has lobbied Paris to restrict 
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the electorate in the 2009 and 2014 
provincial elections to a “frozen” 
pool of long-term residents, namely 
people who were eligible to vote in 
the 1998 referendum on the accord, 
and their descendants (NC, 14 Dec 
2006). The flnks points to massive 
French immigration during the 1970s, 
which marginalized the Kanak and 
pushed them to revolt in the 1980s—a 
demographic threat that is reviving as 
nickel mining is booming due to the 
rise in demand for stainless steel in 
China and India. French migrants to 
other countries must abide by local 
laws, the flnks argues, so they should 
respect that Kanaky / New Caledonia is 
“a country going through a process of 
emancipation” (NC, 30 Dec 2006). The 
loyalists believe, however, that New 
Caledonia is France, despite its being 
on the other side of the world.
Rock Wamytan of the flnks argues 
that Kanak martyrs Jean-Marie Tji-
baou and Yeiwene Yeiwene sacrifi ced 
their lives over the citizenship conces-
sions they had made to non-Kanak 
immigrants, when a radical separatist 
assassinated them on Ouvea in 1989. 
The provisions of the Noumea Accord 
were enacted into laws in 1999 by the 
French National Assembly and Sen-
ate, which also approved the frozen 
electorate concept. The full Congress 
of Versailles (combined Assembly and 
Senate) needed to ratify the latter in 
order to amend the French national 
constitution, but it never met, due to 
many criticisms of the text. In 2003, 
President Jacques Chirac visited New 
Caledonia and vowed to fi nd an 
acceptable solution before the end of 
his term of offi ce, which—because a 
French constitutional referendum in 
2000 shortened the presidential term 
from seven to fi ve years—means a 
deadline of 2007. In early 2005, the 
European Court of Human Rights 
approved the frozen electorate, which 
bitterly disappointed a movement of 
metropolitan French in New Caledo-
nia, who resented becoming “second-
class citizens,” and in March 2006, 
the French Council of Ministers in 
Paris adopted a text (NC, 31 March 
31, 14 Dec 2006). The new law 
would exclude only about 10 percent 
of current voters in New Caledonia 
from voting in provincial elections in 
2009 and 2014, but the proportion is 
higher in the populous, predominantly 
non-Kanak South (14 percent), and 
especially in Noumea (20 percent) 
(NC, 26 April 2006).
The rpcr, which like the fn relies 
considerably on French migrant votes, 
began a campaign in February against 
the proposal, arguing that the 1988 
and 1998 accords had been capitula-
tions by the ruling Socialists in Paris 
to flnks threats of further violence, 
a charge that goes back to old loyalist 
accusations that the Kanak uprising 
in the 1980s was fueled primarily by 
misguided promises by the Socialists, 
then led by President François Mitter-
rand. Pierre Frogier, president of the 
rpcr and deputy to Paris, said he had 
a petition signed by thousands of loy-
alist residents who opposed the frozen 
electorate as a matter of democratic 
principle, because its adoption would 
suggest that “we are no longer in 
France but in an unidentifi ed political 
status” (NC, 17 Feb 2006). The flnks, 
of course, has clearly identifi ed that 
proposed status, but loyalists oppose 
independence. Because the rpcr and 
many members of the ae are mem-
bers of the French president’s Gaullist 
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party, the Union pour un Mouvement 
Populaire (ump), local loyalists were 
divided over whether or not to sup-
port Chirac’s backing of the frozen 
electorate, and in Paris even a minor-
ity of the ump, led by presidential 
hopeful Nicolas Sarkozy, supported 
the rpcr. Simon Loueckhote, rpcr 
senator in Paris, upped the ante and 
suggested that a “sliding” residence 
of only three years, not ten, should be 
the rule, claiming it was the flnks, 
not the rpcr, that was breaking its 
word (NC, 7 Feb 2006). The flnks 
sent a delegation to Paris to lobby for 
what it regarded as the French State’s 
commitment to the Noumea Accord 
and for keeping Chirac’s promise of a 
solution by 2007. The French Social-
ists supported the flnks position, 
as did key leaders of the ump and 
its centrist rival, the Union pour la 
Démocratie Français (udf) (NC, 26 
May 2006). Chirac’s overseas minister, 
François Baroin, announced that the 
two houses of the French Parliament 
would vote on the proposed frozen 
electorate law in late 2006 and early 
2007, so that the full Congress of 
Versailles would be able to ratify it 
soon afterward, but Frogier vowed to 
prevent that from happening (NC, 20 
Oct 2006).
The rhetoric became more heated in 
December, as Marine Le Pen, daughter 
of Jean-Marie Le Pen of the extreme 
nationalist fn, was invited to a public 
debate organized in Noumea by three 
loyalist citizens’ associations. The 
local chapter of the League of the 
Rights of Man (ldh-nc) refused to 
participate in what it called a mixing 
up of French national and territorial 
politics. Its president, Elie Poigoune, 
a veteran of Kanak activism in the 
1970s, pointed to an irony in the fn’s 
strong opposition to immigrant rights 
in France and its support for French 
migrants to New Caledonia: “The fn 
is a profoundly xenophobic party and 
a professed adversary of the rights of 
immigrants in France. It is a menace 
for democracy. We understand very 
well that she is coming here to help 
certain citizens who think that the 
history of the country begins with 
their arrival at the airport” (NC, 4 Dec 
2006). About eight hundred people 
attended the debate, nearly all of 
whom opposed the frozen electorate 
and angrily demanded a local referen-
dum on the issue as well as a debate 
in the local Congress, whose majority 
is loyalist. The only pro-indepen-
dence speaker was Pascal Naouna of 
the Union Calédonienne (uc), who 
voiced his usual support for the frozen 
electorate and the right of the Kanak 
people to self-determination: “The 
country is not only Noumea. For what 
is to come after 2018, the discus-
sions are still ahead of us.” ae lead-
ers, however, despite being loyalists, 
many of whom have long opposed the 
“secret accord” of 1998 between the 
Socialists, flnks and rpcr, accused 
the rpcr of simply playing politics for 
the 2007 elections. The restriction of 
the electorate was expected for a long 
time, and the rpcr had not organized 
its opposition campaign until it sud-
denly found itself a minority in the 
Congress after the 2004 provincial 
elections. The ae leaders said they had 
more important work to do governing 
the country (NC, 6 Dec 2006).
rpcr founder Jacques Lafl eur, who 
had signed the Matignon and Noumea 
Accords, now says the frozen elector-
ate issue needs more discussion, but 
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when the rpcr and fn tried to start 
a debate about it in the Congress in 
December, the government executive 
voted nine to three against the discus-
sion. The ae voted with the flnks, 
and the ae president of Congress, 
Harold Martin, told the rpcr, “Either 
those who signed the Accord did not 
explain everything to you, or you are 
liars.” He pressed his button to restore 
order, and the rpcr walked out, call-
ing it a “sad day for democracy” (NC, 
13–14 Dec 2006). The next day, the 
French National Assembly voted for 
the frozen electorate, with a major-
ity of the ump in favor along with 
the Socialists, Communists, and udf, 
using the arguments that the State 
had to keep its word and that no one 
wanted a return to the violence of the 
1980s in New Caledonia (NC, 15 Dec 
2006). The rpcr got no satisfaction 
in a debate it tried to provoke in the 
assembly of the Southern Province 
in Noumea a week later, as Provin-
cial President Philippe Gomes of the 
ae called their efforts an “electoral 
mascarade” (NC, 22 Dec 2006). The 
French Senate would vote on the law 
in mid-January 2007, so the flnks 
and its allies vowed to march in 
Noumea to show their support for the 
law to succeed, while opponents also 
planned to march against it (NC, 30 
Dec 2006).
Some critics of the flnks have 
called the fl uctuating membership 
of its coalition of pro-independence 
parties a Kanak problem, since the 
indigenous people comprise nearly 
thirty language groups and over one 
hundred tribes (or clans) that “natu-
rally” squabble among themselves 
over leadership and policy. There 
is some truth in that criticism, as 
regional and personal rivalries have 
caused parties to drop out or join 
up since its creation in 1984. Today, 
the two key opponents are the Union 
Calédonienne (uc), the oldest party 
in the country, which arose from 
Kanak church associations allied with 
white liberals and leftists and this year 
celebrated its fi ftieth anniversary (NC, 
18 Dec 2006), and Palika (Parti de 
Libération Kanak), which arose out of 
radical student movements and cele-
brated its thirtieth anniversary (NC, 13 
July 2006). The uc once dominated 
the flnks in the Tjibaou era, but now 
Palika does, and under the banner of 
the National Union for Independence 
(uni) in coalition with the rump 
flnks (ie, uni-flnks), it controls the 
Northern Province, excluding the uc 
from leadership posts. The complex-
ity of politics in the Islands Province 
testifi es to Kanak diversity, while in 
Grande Terre municipal councils, 
pro-independence Kanak parties often 
form ad hoc coalitions with loyalists.
Palika continues to espouse revo-
lutionary socialist Kanak indepen-
dence, said spokesperson Charles 
Washetine, as “the only way for a 
colonized people to regain its dignity,” 
though it also embraces the welfare 
of non-Kanak as “victims of capitalist 
exploitation.” Palika has no president 
and governs itself collectively through 
a ten-member political bureau, relying 
on internal self-criticism and demo-
cratic centralism to remain both a 
party of action on the ground and, 
since the Matignon and Noumea 
Accords, of participation in governing 
institutions (NC, 13 July 2006). The uc 
under Naouna has mostly separated 
from the flnks and used boycotts and 
abstentions to oppose various poli-
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cies. It too supports the accords, but 
it tends to favor “individual initia-
tive” and integration of Kanak into 
the economy. In November, Naouna 
surprised many by proposing free 
association between New Caledonia 
and France, “to take into account 
the realities of globalization. We’re 
headed there, even if some don’t dare 
or want to say it” (NC, 8 Nov 2006). 
In response, Pierre Bretegnier of the 
rpcr proposed a federal arrange-
ment, whereby France would keep 
key governing powers but each of 
the three provinces would have more 
autonomy, thus leaving the Kanak 
to rule themselves in the North and 
Islands provinces, and the multiethnic 
South relatively on its own (NC, 21 
Nov 2006).
Still, a close look at fl uctuations in 
the composition and labels of French 
metropolitan parties shows that 
splintering and forming new coalitions 
is also a very French style of politics, 
because proportional representation 
encourages a multitude of chameleon-
like movements. For example, the 
ruling ump was founded only in 2002 
from the Gaullist Rassemblement pour 
la République, the rpcr’s ally in Paris 
for thirty years, plus some parties 
from the udf, which was founded by 
former President Giscard d’Estaing in 
1978. In fact, the “tribalism” among 
loyalists in New Caledonia became 
even more pronounced in 2006, espe-
cially in the mostly non-Kanak South-
ern Province. The rpcr splintered 
again, after already losing dissidents to 
the ae coalition that won leadership 
of the South and the Congress in the 
2004 elections. In 2005, Frogier and 
Lafl eur had a falling-out, as the former 
took over the rpcr from its founder 
and adopted a new militancy against 
the Noumea Accord, which Lafl eur 
touted as his crowning success at 
peacemaking. In 2001, Harold Martin 
of the ae had also had a falling-out 
with Lafl eur, who forced him out of 
the rpcr. By early 2006, Frogier and 
Martin were trading barbs openly in 
the press, as Martin accused Frogier of 
using two old Lafl eur tactics: diversion 
and fear. Frogier accused Martin of 
spending unnecessary money on lim-
ousines to move around Paris, while 
Martin accused the rpcr of diverting 
millions of francs in public funds to its 
own clients. Martin also accused the 
rpcr of using Sylvain Nea’s militant 
labor union as an army to disrupt the 
country’s economy just to undermine 
the ae regime (NC, 1 April 2006).
In May, Frogier spoke to the rpcr-
ump convention in Boulouparis, reiter-
ating his party’s attachment to France, 
including its desire to adopt the euro 
as local currency. He denounced 
the “socialist and pro-independence 
reading of the Noumea Accord,” 
voicing his opposition to not only the 
frozen electorate concept but also the 
partnership between the Palika-ruled 
North and a Canadian mining corpo-
ration to develop a nickel-processing 
plant. He preferred that the French-
affi liated Société le Nickel (sln) build 
that project (even though another 
Canadian fi rm was building the rpcr-
initiated Goro project in the South). 
He said the primary rpcr adversary 
was the pro-independence parties, 
especially the “communist” regime 
in the North, but he also denigrated 
the ae, calling it “irresponsible” and 
“incompetent” for not recognizing the 
independence threat and for cooperat-
ing with pro-independence parties in 
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the Congress while excluding the rpcr 
from power (just as the rpcr previ-
ously did to other parties). He called 
the Noumea Accord an “act of gener-
osity” on the part of the rpcr, which 
had a sincere desire to “live together,” 
but it promised a sliding, not frozen, 
electorate, which New Caledonians 
approved in the referendum of 1998. 
He warned that if the pro-indepen-
dence parties again “descend into the 
street” to get their way, “they will fi nd 
us in front of them!” (Frogier 2006; 
NC, 22 May 2006). In the Southern 
Province Assembly, the rpcr and ae 
did battle over such issues as environ-
mental regulation of the Goro nickel 
project, and a political pamphlet of 
obvious rpcr origin circulated with 
the title “Rotten Future,” a play on 
the ae party label “Future Together” 
(NC, 16 June 2006).
In July, at the ump national conven-
tion in Paris, presidential candidate 
Sarkozy tried to broker a reconcilia-
tion between Frogier and Martin, who 
was also ump despite his ae affi liation 
in New Caledonia. A well-publicized 
photo of the two sitting at a Paris café 
started a lively discussion in the coun-
try about whether the two leading loy-
alist parties should unite against the 
pro-independence parties, as in days of 
old. Sarkozy said, “You are from the 
same family, you must reunite the fam-
ily” (NC, 14 July 2006). For a while, 
the antagonistic rhetoric died down, 
and both Martin and Frogier made 
overtures in the press toward peace-
making, though Didier Leroux, former 
head of the anti-Lafl eur Alliance Party 
(which was affi liated with the udf) 
and now an ae leader like Martin, 
vowed, “I will not be the cuckold of 
history.” He intended to present him-
self as ae candidate for deputy to the 
French Parliament against an rpcr-
ump candidate (NC, 26 July 2006). 
Gomes of the ae, also a former rpcr 
member, was surprised by the talk of 
a “sandwich coup” negotiated at the 
Paris café and said the ae should not 
allow itself to be manipulated. Martin 
would likely run against Frogier in the 
second district in the legislative elec-
tions in 2007, and Leroux would run 
against whoever replaced Lafl eur (NC, 
11 Aug 2006).
In late July, Lafl eur announced that 
he was forming his own new political 
party, in reality re-forming the Ras-
semblement pour la Calédonie (rpc), 
which he had created in 1977 before 
affi liating it with Chirac’s rpr in 1978 
and thereby changing the label to 
rpcr. With his usual De Gaulle–like 
aplomb, he claimed that New Caledo-
nia “was turning again to me . . . so 
that the country is all right.” Despite 
the economic boom in New Caledo-
nia, he argued, there was an emerging 
social crisis of inequality and a lack 
of majority leadership in the govern-
ment, so his connections with Paris 
after thirty years as deputy could 
ensure that the country had the help it 
needed to keep the peace. He said he 
was unable to reconcile with Frogier, 
as Sarkozy had asked, because “I was 
not adept at the politics of the worst,” 
implying that he would be less alarm-
ist and polarizing than Frogier, whom 
he had once designated as his heir. 
He observed that the loyalists were 
divided, so it was time that he ended 
his retirement from politics: “It’s not 
I who need the people, but the people 
who need me” (NC, 28 Aug 2006; pir, 
3 Aug 2006). By October, his chosen 
party leader, Simon Loueckhote, the 
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rpcr senator to Paris, became head of 
the rpc and claimed that other rpcr 
leaders were joining him in an effort 
to “revive the spirit of 1977,” which 
had a more inclusive vision than the 
newly militant rpcr (NC, 30 Oct 
2006). Lafl eur’s reentry into politics 
created more consternation in the 
ump, which had to decide whether to 
embrace Frogier or dump a longtime 
ally of Chirac. Lafl eur said, “If Cale-
donia does not present a progressive 
face, France will not help us” (NC, 18 
Nov 2006).
Meanwhile, the rpcr held its party 
primary to choose who would run 
for the two legislative seats in Paris in 
2007. Frogier won massive support 
for his reelection campaign as deputy 
of the second district, with 92 percent 
of over three thousand votes cast, 
and in the fi rst district candidate race, 
longtime Lafl eur aide Pierre Maresca 
lost narrowly to Gael Yanno (NC, 
16 Oct 2006). Maresca was upset at 
being accused by a young militant of 
representing the “old guard” of the 
party (NC, 25 Sept 2006), and after he 
lost his chance to represent the party 
in the elections, he went to Paris to 
complain to the ump, hoping to get 
their endorsement anyway, claiming he 
was the victim of a political maneu-
ver. As a pied noir immigrant from 
Algeria, Maresca suggested that he 
could draw the support of the Ocea-
nian communities in New Caledonia, 
that is, Wallisians, leading to specula-
tion that there might be three choices 
for rpcr loyalists in the fi rst district: 
Yanno, Lafl eur, and Maresca (NC, 5 
Dec 2006). Bretegnier said that Fro-
gier should have run in the fi rst district 
instead of favoring Yanno over Mar-
esca, but that dissident rpcr members 
of Congress and the Southern Province 
Assembly had to decide how far to go 
to show their discontent over a manip-
ulated party primary without causing 
a major rupture in the loyalist camp 
(NC, 31 Oct 2006). Frogier fi nally said 
he felt completely disengaged from the 
Noumea Accord because of the frozen 
electorate issue, and he sided with 
Sarkozy’s wing of the ump who also 
opposed the new law. His stand won 
him offi cial support from the ump, 
along with Yanno, against Lafl eur and 
Maresca (NC, 21–22 Dec 2006). As 
for the ae, Martin was reelected its 
president and would lead its campaign 
for deputy, saying the rpcr “needed 
a new defeat” (NC, 2 Oct 2006). He 
had already been reelected president of 
the Congress in July, thanks to sup-
port from not only the ae but also the 
fn, an ex-rpcr dissident, and Nidoish 
Naisseline’s Libération Kanak Social-
iste (lks) (NC, 29 July 2006). François 
Bayrou, head of the udf, stopped 
off in November after visiting French 
Polynesia to lend his offi cial support 
to Leroux, who would take on the 
divided rpcr in the fi rst district, and 
he also praised the ae in general (NC, 
3 Nov 2006).
The ae-led government continued 
on its reformist path, encouraged by 
increased French funding for socio-
economic development (NC, 3 March 
2006). It responded positively to a 
mass street demonstration by ten thou-
sand people in April against the rising 
cost of living. The protest was orga-
nized by a coalition of labor unions 
led by Didier Guenant-Jeanson’s 
Union Syndicaliste des Ouvriers et 
Employés de la Nouvelle-Calédonie 
(usoenc), which complained about 
an infl ation rate (2.6 percent) that was 
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the highest since 1993 (NC, 21 April 
2006). If that infl ation rate seems 
small by world standards, the already-
high cost of living that it adds to (due 
to massive budgetary transfers from 
Paris, the near-monopoly power of 
certain importers, and bloated salaries 
paid to French civil servants overseas) 
has long been a target of criticism. 
In 2006, the French budget ministry 
complained that metropolitan retirees 
who moved overseas specifi cally to get 
raises in their pensions (almost double 
the normal base salary, thanks to the 
“hardship pay” earned by French 
civil servants in New Caledonia) were 
costing the country 245 million euros, 
a 70 percent increase since 2000 (pir, 
14 Nov 2006; NC, 13 March 2006; 
TPM, Nov 2006). Over 83 percent 
of such retirees, half of whom were 
ex-military, had never served in New 
Caledonia, whereas in French Reunion 
in the Indian Ocean, 80 percent were 
native to the island (NC, 8 Jan 2007). 
To help the country’s workers sur-
vive, usoenc demanded diverting 5 
francs from the price of every pound 
of nickel exported to a government 
relief fund, eliminating taxes on basic 
foods such as fl our and rice, and a 
variety of other tax relief reforms 
for lower income inhabitants (NC, 
1 March 2006). The rpcr quickly 
blamed the ae for causing the prob-
lem and opposed reforms, but Leroux 
argued that similar rates of infl ation 
had occurred under the rpcr regime, 
though recent local tax increases to 
help pay for self-governance might 
have to be reconsidered, such as the 
sales tax (NC, 18 March, 20 April 
2006). After a series of roundtable 
discussions with stakeholders, the 
government proposed reforms in June 
to the Congress: increasing family 
allowances, raising the minimum 
wage, lowering food taxes, reviv-
ing price controls, freezing rents for 
a year while new price controls are 
devised, imposing a surtax on quick 
resales of real estate to reduce specu-
lation, arranging interest-free loans 
and reducing legal costs for fi rst-home 
buyers, and negotiating with banks to 
lower their service charges; the nickel-
derived subsidy would have to be 
debated in Congress (NC, 7 June 2006; 
pir, 9 June 2006). Congress passed 
most of these measures and also subsi-
dized electricity costs by  cutting taxes 
to prevent a rate hike (NC, 11 Nov 
2006).
The ae argued that its social and 
economic policies were improving 
life in the country, as unemployment 
declined and job offers increased, 
affordable housing was built, work 
safety and right-to-employment stan-
dards were brought closer to European 
levels, commercial development in the 
South was encouraged but also regu-
lated, and the province bought hotels, 
casinos, and improved infrastructure 
and transportation to boost tourism 
(NC, 1 July, 17 July, 18 Aug, 31 Aug, 
3 Oct, 20 Oct, 15 Dec 2006). New 
Caledonia Fisheries, based at Koumac 
in the North, fi nally turned a profi t 
(NC, 27 Feb 2006), and a govern-
ment committee met weekly to screen 
job hiring in an effort to favor local 
residents over foreigners whenever 
possible (NC, 22 Nov 2006). French 
fi nancial grants gave the thirty-three 
municipalities of the country a 5 per-
cent increase in development aid, for 
a total of us$78 million, which would 
be divided among the three provinces, 
about half going to the more popu-
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lous South and half to the North and 
Islands (NC, 7 July, 25 Aug 2006). 
France provides us$1.5 billion a year 
in direct assistance to New Caledonia, 
and together with the nickel sales and 
mining boom the local economy is 
prospering. In December, the Congress 
voted a 2007 budget of us$1.3 billion, 
all but one fourth of which would go 
to the provinces and communes. The 
budget passed with support of the ae, 
the uc, and the uni-flnks, while the 
fn abstained in protest against the 
frozen electorate, and the rpcr-ump 
voted against (NC, 23 Dec 2006; pir, 
27 Dec 2006). A “Day of Citizenship” 
at the Mwâ Kâ in Noumea, which was 
held on 23 September as an alternative 
to the former commemoration of the 
French taking possession of New Cale-
donia on 24 September 1853, was not 
attended by the rpcr because Frogier 
“absolutely did not share the con-
ception of citizenship” as expressed 
in the frozen electorate. Some other 
loyalists followed suit, as did the lks, 
but the ae, Palika, uc, and other 
groups attended, voicing support for 
the recognition of Kanak identity and 
of other local cultures in the spirit of 
the Noumea Accord’s call to build a 
common destiny (NC, 21 Sept, 25 Sept 
2006).
On the cultural front, the govern-
ment introduced educational stan-
dards for localizing history and geog-
raphy education and for the teaching 
of Kanak languages in schools in order 
to promote a sense of citizenship and 
common destiny among youth (NC, 
13 March, 18 April 2006), and the 
offi cial minutes of Kanak customary 
meetings acquired judicial status (NC, 
2 June 2006). The ldh-nc sponsored 
a public discussion in Noumea on 
the concept of biological and cultural 
metissage (blending), which colonial 
segregation had hindered, and the 
small community of La Foa celebrated 
its multicultural heritage (NC, 1 Sept, 2 
Oct 2006). Yet the ethnic census that 
had been planned to measure prog-
ress in economic rebalancing among 
regions was canceled due to lack of 
French funding, and tensions contin-
ued between Kanak and Wallisians in 
schools and neighborhoods. A mov-
ing fi lm documented the reconcilia-
tion among Kanak families who lost 
members in the 1989 assassination of 
Tjibaou on Ouvea, but two concerts 
by singer Francis Cabrel had to be 
canceled because of anonymous death 
threats over his support for the Kanak 
during the 1988 Ouvea uprising (NC, 
18 July, 25 Aug, 30 Aug, 9 Oct, 2 Dec 
2006). Progress was made environ-
mentally, as European development 
funds fi nanced the rehabilitation of 
mining sites around Thio, the coun-
try tightened its protection of local 
biodiversity, and the Congress voted 
unanimously to support having six 
zones in the country’s coral reef clas-
sifi ed by unesco as World Heritage 
sites (NC, 17 Feb, 14 June, 28 Aug, 
18 Dec 2006).
On the regional level, two main 
events stand out: the second France-
Oceania summit in Paris, and the 
Pacifi c Forum’s granting of associate 
member status to New Caledonia. 
Using the carrot of aid money, the 
Chirac government has pushed for 
better relations between France and 
the neighbors of its Pacifi c territories; 
so in June, sixteen heads of state fl ew 
to Paris at French expense to partake 
of his diplomacy. The Noumea daily 
Les Nouvelles-Calédoniennes called it 
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a “climatic warming” as participants 
were entertained by Kanak danc-
ers at the newly opened Quai Branly 
Museum, which is entirely devoted 
to displaying indigenous cultures. 
Chirac declared, “The past is one 
thing, but the future is hand in hand 
cooperation.” Sir Michael Somare of 
Papua New Guinea, perhaps look-
ing for leverage against Australian 
infl uence in the Forum, announced, 
“France has changed its attitude. It 
now treats the peoples of the Pacifi c 
Islands honestly.” Yet when Oscar 
Temaru, still president of French 
Polynesia before his fall from power 
in December, expressed regret that 
the principle of self-determination 
was absent from the fi nal conference 
declaration, Gomes said he was out 
of order, and the ae President of New 
Caledonia Marie-Noelle Themereau 
said, “Instead of making ideologi-
cal outbursts, it is preferable to deal 
with basic issues.” Chirac stressed 
that France was also a conduit for aid 
money from the European Union, a 
frequently heard argument, though the 
EU has already helped Pacifi c coun-
tries without France. Paul Neaouty-
ine, Palika president of the Northern 
Province, supported integrating the 
French Pacifi c into the region, while 
Frogier saw it as “a recognition of 
France’s place in the Pacifi c. To see in 
such a majestic place the gathering of 
Pacifi c region leaders is a very power-
ful symbol” (NC, 28 June 2006; pir, 
29 March, 15 June 2006). In Port 
Moresby in October, the Pacifi c Forum 
leaders, no doubt with the taste of 
Beaujolais and brie still on their lips, 
endorsed New Caledonia and French 
Polynesia as associate members, while 
Wallis and Futuna became an observer. 
Somare said, “This relationship is on a 
progressive path. This time, there is a 
real commitment to help us” (pir, 26 
Oct 2006). New Caledonia strength-
ened its diplomatic ties with Australia 
and Vanuatu (pir, 22 June, 30 Aug 
2006), while New Zealand television 
broadcast videos of the 1985 trial of 
French bombers of the Greenpeace 
antinuclear protest vessel Rainbow 
Warrior, which showed agents Mafart 
and Prieur confessing to murder (NC, 
16 Aug 2006).
The mining industry of New Cale-
donia felt the impact of globalization 
in corporate fi nance, as huge foreign 
companies responded to the rapidly 
rising world price of nickel by compet-
ing to buy controlling interest in inco 
and Falconbridge, two Canadian fi rms 
that had been scheduled to build local 
nickel processing plants. In October 
2005 it even looked as if inco, slated 
to develop the Goro project in the 
South, would buy Falconbridge, with 
which the Northern Province’s Société 
Minerale Sud Pacifi que (smsp) had 
already negotiated 51 percent owner-
ship of the Koniambo project. But an 
antitrust investigation by the United 
States (because both inco and Fal-
conbridge listed their stocks on Wall 
Street), complications over French 
State funding, and a threat to turn the 
Koniambo project over to the sln if 
the Bercy Accord deadline of fi nalizing 
the deal by the end of 2005 was not 
met, led the smsp to ask Falconbridge 
to fi nance the whole project, while the 
smsp would repay its share with royal-
ties. Then Teck Cominco of Vancouver 
offered to take over inco, with which 
the Southern Province had negotiated 
very low royalties (only 10 percent 
for the province and the country) for 
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Goro, while Xstrata of Switzerland 
offered to buy Falconbridge (NC, 26 
May 2006). Next, US-based Phelps 
Dodge offered to buy both inco 
and Falconbridge in an increasingly 
complex bidding war that fl uctuated 
with stock and nickel prices, but inco 
pulled out of the Falconbridge take-
over bid by July, leaving the latter to 
Xstrata. When Grupo Mexico offered 
to buy Phelps Dodge, the spokesper-
son for the Koniambo project said, 
“It’s diffi cult to comment about things 
that happen above our heads” (NC, 
16 Aug 2006). By August, Xstrata 
confi rmed its purchase of Falconbridge 
and assured the workers that no lay-
offs were planned (NC, 17 Aug 2006). 
Teck Cominco and Phelps Dodge 
still showed interest in inco, while 
Xstrata, the British fi rm Rio Tinto and 
the Brazilian fi rm Companhia Vale do 
Rio Doce (cvrd) considered combin-
ing their capital to buy out rival Anglo 
American and divide up the spoils (NC, 
23 Aug 2006). By November, cvrd 
of Brazil had confi rmed its purchase 
of inco. Because the price of a ton 
of nickel had risen from us$6,000 in 
2001 to about us$30,000, Xstrata 
paid us$17 billion for Falconbridge, 
and cvrd paid almost us$16 billion 
for inco (pir, 7 Nov 2006).
But would the new owners respect 
previous agreements with New Cale-
donia, when they had operations 
all over the world to reevaluate? In 
September, Neaoutyine met with Mick 
Davis of Xstrata, who assured him 
that the Koniambo project would 
be built under the same arrange-
ments the smsp had already made 
with Falconbridge. That same day, 
Neaoutyine met with Ku-Taek Lee of 
South Korea’s Posco, a metallurgical 
fi rm that agreed to process the nickel 
ore produced by the smsp’s fi ve other 
mining sites in the North, the profi ts 
of which would help develop both 
the North and Islands Provinces. In 
addition to diversifying the North’s 
portfolio, which acquired 51 percent 
ownership of a new Korean process-
ing plant at Gwangyang, the Posco 
deal would also extend the smsp’s 
long-term resources by reducing the 
nickel content of the ore provided to 
the Posco plant to just over 2 percent 
(NC, 15 Sept 2006). In December, the 
Northern Province Assembly voted 
a us$340 million budget for 2007, 
after a lively debate about indepen-
dence between Neaoutyine and France 
Debien of the rpcr. Debien asked 
whether the nickel mining alone could 
provide for local needs when France 
was still providing massive fi nancial 
assistance. Neaoutyine replied that 
France was obligated to support the 
country in the Noumea Accord, but 
also said, “There is obviously a coun-
try, and a people, that was colonized. 
It’s a duty to remember that imposes 
itself, and thus a need to prepare the 
means to decolonize and build a citi-
zenship” (NC, 20 Dec 2006). The rpcr 
argued for months that the sln should 
take over the Koniambo project to 
keep the plant in “national” hands. 
Frogier claimed the North had wasted 
French funds for economic rebalanc-
ing and done nothing for its people 
but force them to migrate to the South 
for work (NC, 21 Aug, 5 Sept, 14 Oct 
2006). In December, New Caledonia 
increased its shares in the sln to 34 
percent by exchanging some of its 
shares of Eramet, the parent holding 
company (NC, 1 Dec 2006).
The Goro project in the South is 
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another story, because of the low 
royalties promised and objections to 
environmental pollution and the use of 
foreign construction workers. In fact, 
protests have shut down the project 
more than once since 2002. In early 
2006, 1,600 workers, 90 percent of 
whom were local, were employed by 
Goro Nickel, though it said that lack 
of specialized local training in certain 
fi elds necessitated hiring hundreds of 
Filipinos. inco promised to be very 
careful about pollution issues, and the 
Southern Province said it would be 
vigilant (NC, 3 March 2006). In April, 
however, Raphael Mapou’s Rhéébù 
Nùù (Eye of the Country) again 
besieged the work site. It protested 
against pollution, demanded that roy-
alties be paid directly to local chiefs, 
put up blockades, and used inco 
machines to dig deep ditches. Four 
trucks of French gendarmes arrived, 
made arrests in a hail of stones, clubs, 
and Molotov cocktails, and soon liber-
ated the site, but the next day Rhéébù 
Nùù was back with banners along the 
access roads and demands for discus-
sions. Local residents who relied on 
Goro for jobs staged counterprotests 
and marched into Noumea. In the 
trial of a Rhéébù Nùù protester who 
burned a company vehicle, the pros-
ecutor argued, “The Northern plant 
will pollute just as much and so far no 
one has protested. The real question 
is to know what degree of pollution 
the residents are ready to accept. Will 
the mud of Koniambo be less red 
because the factory will be Kanak?” 
The defense attorney replied, “We 
know that the construction permit 
was granted by the Southern Province 
against the advice of its own Environ-
mental Offi ce. . . . The real instigators 
of this violence are the leaders of inco 
and the Southern Province” (NC, 3–6 
April 2006).
During sporadic negotiations, Goro 
Nickel told many of its employees to 
stop working for security reasons, 
while it still paid them, and it assessed 
the damage to the site at us$10 mil-
lion. Wamytan of the Customary 
Senate and also Caugern (Comité 
autochtone pour la gestion des res-
sources naturelles) represented Rhéébù 
Nùù in the talks, but Mapou did not 
show up (NC, 7–8 April 2006; rnzi, 
7 April 2006). While Frogier called 
on Sarkozy for military and police 
reinforcements, the flnks tried to 
negotiate between Rhéébù Nùù and 
pro-Goro chiefs. The sln proposed it 
should develop a new processing plant 
at Prony, next to Goro, and 600 pro-
Goro protesters marched again into 
Noumea (NC, 12–13 April 2006). The 
police broke up Rhéébù Nùù picket 
sites and set up barricades to protect 
access to Goro, allowing work on the 
Prony electrical plant to resume, but 
Rhéébù Nùù, supported by Caugern, 
local environmentalists and the pro-
independence Union Syndicaliste 
des Travailleurs Kanak et Employés 
(ustke) organized an anti-Goro march 
of 1,200 in Noumea (NC, 19–21 April, 
24 April 2006). Gomes of the South-
ern Province announced that a third 
environmental impact study would 
begin, this time focusing on potential 
effl uents of chrome and manganese, 
which Rhéébù Nùù argued would 
exceed EU standards (NC, 25 April, 
28 April 2006). The study would 
take time, but Mapou went to court 
on charges of armed conspiracy and 
traffi c blockage, while he sued and 
was countersued by Gomes and the 
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head of Goro Nickel. Supporters of 
Rhéébù Nùù still blocked the trans-
port of workers to Goro by ferry and 
sabotaged the Goro water supply (NC, 
10–12 May, 23 May 2006).
The ae government warned against 
the damage Rhéébù Nùù was doing 
to the image of New Caledonia in 
the eyes of outside investors as well 
as to local development (NC, 25 May 
2006), while the flnks denounced the 
“opportunist” tactics of Rhéébù Nùù 
and backed “the industrial projects 
in progress” (kol, 2 June 2006). But 
in June, 2,500 protesters marched 
against Goro Nickel in Noumea with 
French antiglobalization activist José 
Bové participating (NC, 6 June 2006). 
Soon after, a local administrative 
court voided Goro Nickel’s permit to 
develop the site because estimated pol-
lution by manganese effl uents would 
be one hundred times the acceptable 
EU norm. The court thus legitimized 
Rhéébù Nùù concerns, though it 
required more government investiga-
tion, not a construction shutdown (NC, 
15 June 2006; pir, 15 June 2006). 
While judicial proceedings against 
Rhéébù Nùù continued, its supporters 
renewed protests against the “illegal-
ity” of Goro Nickel, which offered 
a pact to the citizens of the South, 
promising to recruit more local work-
ers and businesses, pay for training, 
strengthen its pollution controls, and 
participate in a broadly based over-
sight committee (NC, 5 July, 14 July 
2006). Still unsatisfi ed, Rhéébù Nùù 
and Caugern called for a month of 
mobilization to promote discussions, 
but they refrained from calling for a 
shutdown (NC, 26 Aug 2006). Mean-
while, inco was taken over by cvrd 
of Brazil, which claimed to “have a 
good relationship with indigenous 
communities” because it was from the 
Southern Hemisphere, even though in 
October, 200 armed Brazilian Indians 
seized a company mining town and 
took 600 hostages to demand develop-
ment aid (NC, 15 Aug, 16 Nov 2006; 
IHT 13 Dec 2006). In October, the 
new environmental study warned of 
pollution by effl uent processing acids, 
cobalt, chrome, and manganese, so a 
Paris court ordered Goro to halt con-
struction of its waste storage site (NC, 
22–23 Nov 2006; pir, 21 Nov 2006).
Other disruptions came from labor 
unions whose concerns also became 
political and affected the mining 
industry. ustke, the largest and most 
pro-independence union in the country 
(a former member of the flnks, in 
fact), conducted high-impact strikes 
in the cause of protecting local hiring 
and businesses from outside compe-
tition. Besides shutting down most 
schools on the east coast of Grande 
Terre for a month in March and 
repeatedly disrupting Noumea’s city 
buses to protect its members (NC, 11 
March, 3 April, 12 July 2006), ustke 
blockaded the rfo (Réseau Français 
d’Outremer) television station over 
Rock Haocas, whose case had already 
caused ustke to shut down rfo for 
most of three months in 2004. In that 
year, Haocas returned from technical 
training in France but was hired by 
rfo for a lower-paying job because 
it had no post that fi t his qualifi ca-
tions, thus making him the focus of a 
local hiring dispute. Courts in 2005 
had twice convicted Haocas of violent 
behavior toward a coworker dur-
ing that strike, so rfo wanted to fi re 
him this year, but ustke objected to 
the court conviction and the fi ring, 
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demanding that Haocas be transferred 
to another job (NC, 14 Feb, 22 March 
2006). Of 150 employees at rfo, only 
12 participated in the ustke block-
ade, so it used a tactic of intermittent 
work stoppages, sometimes allow-
ing the other employees to work and 
other times preventing them from 
having access to rfo, even interrupt-
ing work part way through the day, 
so the employer could not feasibly put 
workers on paid leave. rfo refused to 
renegotiate with ustke, so non-strik-
ing workers became exasperated, as 
did the rest of the population, with the 
unpredictable tv broadcasts (NC, 29 
March, 15 April, 29 April 2006). The 
ldh-nc and flnks, among others, 
denounced the strike, which went on 
for six months despite court action 
that imposed daily fi nes on the union 
(NC, 1 June, 18–19 July, 10 Aug 2006). 
Finally, in November, rfo agreed to 
transfer Haocas to France and help 
him fi nd a job in another television 
enterprise (NC, 10 Nov 2006).
ustke also blocked the main 
seaport for fi ve weeks in May and 
June, to protest what it called inva-
sions of the New Caledonia market 
by large foreign companies, such as 
the Mediterranean Shipping Company 
(msc) and Maersk, without negoti-
ating proper agreements with local 
stevedore companies like Manutrans, 
which happens to be owned by the 
former president of ustke (NC, 20 
May 2006). ustke erected a wall 
of layered containers around the 
port but eventually let other vessels 
unload while preventing the msc and 
Maersk ships from doing so. Rival 
labor unions protested the stoppage 
and tried to force their way in, and 
the flnks again denounced ustke for 
the strike. Finally, one hundred fi fty 
French police liberated the port in a 
swift but violent battle, only to have 
ustke protest outside the police sta-
tion, demanding the release of those 
arrested and threatening a general 
strike (NC, 24 May, 1 June, 3 June, 
9–10 June 2006; pir, 9 June 2006). 
ustke and the two shipping compa-
nies reached understandings in late 
June and July to “recognize the par-
ticularities of New Caledonia” so that 
local companies do not get squeezed 
out of the market. Labor minister 
Gerald Cortot suggested that instead 
of having shipping lines make separate 
contracts with local stevedore compa-
nies, the latter should work together 
to share the market (NC, 24 June, 
11 July 2006; pir, 23 July 2006). 
ustke closed out its year with judicial 
proceedings against its members and 
leaders, while ustke President Gerard 
Jodar vowed that the union would 
become a political party (NC, 29 Nov, 
7 Dec 2006).
Sylvain Nea has developed quite 
a reputation, and court record, for 
labor strikes that interfere with daily 
activities in New Caledonia, espe-
cially since he was expelled from 
usoenc and struggled to establish 
his own Conféderation Syndicale des 
Travail leurs de la Nouvelle-Calédonie 
(cstnc), which has became the fi fth-
largest union in the country (NC, 22 
July 2006). A seven-and-a-half-month 
blockade of the Surf Novotel Hotel 
in Noumea was so catastrophic for 
the owners that it went bankrupt in 
January 2006. In the accord fi nally 
reached in April, outside investors 
pulled out and the local owner, the 
Northern Province, had to convert 
half of the rooms into apartments. 
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The main thing that cstnc gained was 
offi cial recognition, while its ten fi red 
members remained unemployed (NC, 
22 March, 26 April 2006). The cstnc 
also struck against the sln for three 
months in late 2005, and in April 
2006, the union won its case in court, 
when the administrative tribunal in 
Noumea agreed that the sln had 
unfairly fi red two cstnc members for 
blocking access to a dangerous electri-
cal installation at the Doniambo nickel 
processing plant (NC, 22 April, 19 
May 2006). The cstnc struck again in 
2006 by shutting down the sln medi-
cal center for seven weeks over the 
transfer of a female worker to another 
local facility; it also argued that Nea’s 
former branch of usoenc, soenc 
Nickel, should no longer be on the 
administrative council of the center, 
since cstnc had a majority of mem-
bers in the sln upcountry (outside 
Doniambo). Police liberated the medi-
cal center in July, but other blockages 
persisted, so that neither medical care 
nor reimbursements were available to 
sln workers, and when non-striking 
employees tried to go back to work, 
they were ordered away. An accord 
was reached in August, when the 
transfer was delayed for two months 
pending further negotiations (NC, 30 
March, 29 July, 8 Aug, 10 Aug, 19 
Aug 2006).
The next month, Nea declared 
a general strike on political issues, 
which he used as a pretext for block-
ading the sln again, among many 
other sites. The cstnc demanded the 
immediate beginning of construction 
on the Northern nickel processing 
plant, the expulsion of Filipino work-
ers from Goro, new taxes on the rich 
and on capital exports, a 50 percent 
reduction in gasoline prices, and the 
reduction of prices for other necessi-
ties such as rice. Despite rumors, Nea 
insisted that the rpcr was not behind 
his strike trying to undermine the ae 
government, though he did demand 
that the ae government resign and 
called for new elections (NC, 21 Sept, 
27 Sept 2006). Ironically, his 1,500 
strikers shut down many of the local 
gasoline stations, as well as baker-
ies, while Goro withdrew most of its 
workers from the construction site, 
except for the 550 Filipinos, who had 
no place else to go (NC, 28 Sept 2006). 
ustke also condemned the hiring of 
Filipinos, claiming to have seen them 
doing many unskilled or semiskilled 
jobs that local workers could be hired 
to do, and not just specialized techni-
cal tasks (NC, 22 Sept 2006). It was 
also revealed that the Filipinos were 
paid the minimum wage for New 
Caledonia, us$1000 a month, minus 
30 percent for room and board, and 
they were of course not unionized 
(NC, 30 Oct 2006). The ae govern-
ment argued that its reforms were 
already lowering the cost of  living in 
New Caledonia, and it sued Nea for 
costing local businesses millions of 
francs with his strikes, disrupting local 
life with so many different demands, 
putting two thousand Caledonians out 
of work at Goro, and preaching racial 
hatred (NC, 29 Sept 2006). The cstnc 
organized processions in Noumea by 
large mineral trucks and tractors and 
shut down the upcountry sln mines 
that provided Doniambo with ore to 
process, which stirred up antistrike 
protests. As the strike dragged on, 
even some cstnc members began to 
defect because they weren’t being paid, 
until a few illegally diverted sln funds 
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to them (NC, 6–7 Oct, 12 Oct, 24 Oct 
2006).
After a month-long blockade, the 
police liberated Doniambo, but only 
two of its four ore sources upcoun-
try were functioning. The rpcr and 
ae traded barbs over alleged politi-
cal plotting behind the strike, while 
the cstnc adopted ustke’s tactic 
of on-again, off-again picketing and 
blockages (NC, 14 Dec, 17 Oct, 20 Oct 
2006). The cstnc even shut down the 
local newspaper temporarily for what 
it considered unfair reporting (pir, 7 
Nov 2006), while repeated negotia-
tions stalled. Nea went to court for 
his appeal of a conviction from the 
previous year of blockades that had 
condemned him to three months in 
prison. The judge upheld the convic-
tion and sentence, but told Nea that 
he could appeal to a higher court, and 
that there would likely be a “more 
or less generous” amnesty granted 
after the 2007 presidential elections 
for union-related offenses. By mid-
November, Nea was softening his 
general strike demands, was arrested 
for diverting sln funds and, with two 
associates, was fi ned us$20,000, and 
soon was offering to resign from the 
sln (but not his union) if the company 
did not fi re nine of his union mem-
bers. After three months of striking 
and often-paralyzing rush hour traffi c 
jams, the Filipinos were still working 
for Goro, the ae was still in power, 
and nearly every organization in New 
Caledonia was fed up with Nea, even 
if it supported aspects of his concerns 
(NC, 23 Nov, 20 Dec 2006). The sln, 
which actually had little to do with his 
specifi c strike demands, claimed that 
it had lost us$110 million from work 
interruptions and so much credibility 
that it could get only short-term con-
tracts overseas (NC, 19 Dec 2006). 
david chappell
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Solomon Islands
For Solomon Islands, 2006 brought 
a lot of expectations for positive 
change, especially with regard to 
political leadership at the national 
level. Many Solomon Islanders hoped 
that the national elections, scheduled 
for April, would bring about a change 
of government. The government that 
had ruled since 2001 under Sir Allan 
Kemakeza was perceived by many as 
incompetent and had failed miser-
ably on the credibility scale. There 
was hope, therefore, that the election 
would usher in a new government. 
These expectations were backed by 
the fact that the 2006 election was the 
fi rst truly free and fair election. It was 
the fi rst election since the deployment 
of the Regional Assistance Mission 
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to Solomon Islands (ramsi), which 
disarmed most of those involved in 
the years of civil unrest from late 1998 
to mid-2003. Although the previous 
national election (in 2001) had been 
declared free and fair by international 
and domestic observers, many Solo-
mon Islanders knew that because of 
the widespread presence of guns in the 
communities at that time, voters had 
not really been free to choose. There 
had been evidence of intimidation of 
voters in some places. Much of this 
occurred before and after the election, 
and thus was never seen by observers 
who were present mainly on the day 
of the election. 
The 2006 election, however, 
brought drama that dominated most 
of the year. Much of it emanated from 
dissatisfaction over the outcome of the 
election of the prime minister. Further, 
the newly elected Solomon Islands 
government engaged in a protracted 
diplomatic row with its Australian 
counterpart. This was largely a result 
of what Honiara saw as Canberra’s 
interference in Solomon Islands 
domestic affairs. There were also 
debates about the regional assistance 
mission and Australia’s dominant role 
in it. 
These events and debates high-
light the vulnerability of post-confl ict 
societies and the challenges of rebuild-
ing societies and states that have been 
traumatized by confl icts. They also 
demonstrate the challenges for inter-
national intervention and the role of 
foreign governments in post-confl ict 
reconstruction. 
The year kicked off on an upbeat 
note as many people joined families 
and friends in villages around the 
country to celebrate Christmas and 
New Year. But as most people enjoyed 
the holidays, those intending to stand 
for offi ce were busy preparing for the 
elections. By the time registrations 
closed, a record number of 453 candi-
dates were signed up to contest in the 
fi fty constituencies. This was an aver-
age of 9.1 candidates per constituency, 
up from 6.6 in 2001. The election, 
held on 5 April, was declared a success 
by international and local observers. 
By the time the votes had all been 
counted, half the sitting members 
of Parliament had lost their seats. 
Among them were Joses Tuhanuku, 
the leader of the Labour Party, and 
Alfred Sasako, the outspoken member 
for East Kwaio on Malaita. Some of 
the prominent fi gures in the previous 
Kemakeza-led government, however, 
retained their seats. These included Sir 
Allan Kemakeza himself; Snyder Rini, 
his deputy in the previous govern-
ment; Laurie Chan; and Peter Boyes. 
The other Big-men of Solomon Islands 
politics who were also reelected 
were Job Dudley Tausinga (who ran 
unopposed in his North New Geor-
gia constituency), Francis Billy Hilly, 
Bartholomew Ulufa‘alu, Manasseh 
Sogavare, and Patterson Oti. 
In the days following the national 
election, members of Parliament 
gathered in Honiara to prepare for 
the “second election”—the election of 
the prime minister, which would also 
determine who formed the govern-
ment. This period, as usual, was char-
acterized by intense lobbying, both 
among the members of Parliament and 
from lobbyists outside. This is also 
a period during which, in the past, 
there were allegations that powerful 
individuals with big money would 
often bribe members of Parliament to 
pol i t ical reviews • melanesia 599
ensure that any government that was 
formed would favor them. Members 
of Parliament usually form coalitions 
or “camps” and try to lure enough 
other members to make up suffi cient 
numbers to form a government. 
The election of the prime minis-
ter was held on 18 April, with three 
candidates up for the post: Tausinga, 
Rini, and Sogavare. Rini eventually 
emerged as winner, bringing back into 
power the old Kemakeza-led govern-
ment. This was a coalition between 
the People’s Alliance Party, Lafari, 
and the Association of Independent 
Members. Also with the group were 
Sogavare and four of his followers 
who had defected from the other side 
only days before.
The hundreds of people who 
gathered outside Parliament that day 
found the result unacceptable. They 
jeered at the newly elected prime 
minister, demanding that he step down 
and allow Tausinga to take over the 
reigns of power. Some demanded that 
the members of Parliament go back 
into the chamber and vote again. The 
crowd soon became rowdy and their 
actions quickly deteriorated into vio-
lent confrontations with the police. 
When the police deployed tear gas, 
the protestors moved into the main 
streets of Honiara, destroying and 
looting Asian (mostly Chinese) busi-
nesses. By the end of that day, most 
of the shops in Chinatown had been 
looted and burned. The destruction 
went on into the next day, prompting 
hundreds of Chinese families to fl ee. 
Australia sent in troops from Towns-
ville, Queensland, to help local and 
ramsi police stop the violence. It was 
the worst public destruction ever seen 
in Honiara.
The Chinese — or waku, as they 
are known locally—were targeted 
because of a widespread perception 
that it had been Asian businesses who 
bankrolled Rini’s group and infl uenced 
the result of the election. Francis Billy 
Hilly, for example, alleged that large 
sums of money changed hands to win 
over the support of certain members 
of Parliament. He claimed that as 
much as si$30,000 to si$50,000 had 
been offered to individual members to 
vote for Rini (Solomon Star, 18 April 
2006). This assertion, like similar 
allegations in the past, has never been 
substantiated.
In the days that followed, pro-
testors continued to demand Rini’s 
resignation. The newly elected prime 
minister, however, refused to give 
in, arguing that he had been elected 
through a constitutional process and 
could only be ousted through that 
process. But despite his persistence, on 
26 April — only eight days after being 
elected into offi ce — Rini was forced 
to resign on the fl oor of Parliament. 
This became necessary after Sogavare 
and his followers crossed the fl oor and 
joined the Opposition. In announc-
ing his resignation, Rini said that he 
did so “because I did not have the 
numbers this morning in parliament, 
I had no option but to resign to give 
way for the election of a new Prime 
Minister. I did not resign as a result of 
calls by the protestors. I did not yield 
to the calls of the protestors because 
I did not want to set a bad precedent 
for future Prime Ministers of this 
country” (Government Information 
Service, 26 April 2006). 
Rini’s resignation made way for 
another election. Manasseh Soga-
vare and Fred Fono, the member for 
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Central Kwara‘ae, contested, and 
Sogavare was elected as prime minis-
ter. He subsequently chose Job Dudley 
Tausinga to be deputy and moved to 
form a Grand Coalition Government 
with a number of political parties and 
some independents. 
In announcing his cabinet, Soga-
vare included Charles Dausabea and 
Nelson Ne‘e, two Honiara members of 
Parliament who had allegedly incited 
and organized the riots. At the time 
of their appointment, both had been 
charged and were in jail awaiting trial. 
Dausabea was appointed minister of 
Police and National Security, while 
Ne‘e was minister for Culture and 
Tourism. Their appointments attracted 
widespread criticism, both locally 
and internationally. The criticisms 
intensifi ed when, in setting up a com-
mission of enquiry into the riots, the 
Prime Minister’s Offi ce included in the 
commission’s terms of reference items 
that were perceived as prejudicial to 
the court processes and were seen as 
aimed at exonerating the two contro-
versial cabinet ministers. Among those 
who expressed concern about the 
terms of reference was then Attorney 
General Primo Afeau. 
Criticism also came from the Aus-
tralian government through Foreign 
Affairs Minister Alexander Downer, 
who expressed disappointment and 
concern over the appointment of 
the two controversial members of 
Parliament as cabinet ministers. But 
Canberra was also concerned that the 
terms of reference for the commis-
sion of enquiry were designed to place 
blame on Australian Federal Police 
serving on ramsi. 
Sogavare, who has never been a fan 
of Australia, lashed out at Canberra, 
accusing the Australian government 
of interfering in Solomon Islands 
domestic affairs. The Solomon Star (9 
May 2006), for example, reported that 
Sogavare had accused Foreign Min-
ister Downer “of interfering with the 
domestic affairs of Solomon Islands.” 
Sogavare said that “Australia’s con-
demnation of the ministerial appoint-
ments of two Members of Parliament 
is clearly an interference in local poli-
tics.” He even threatened to terminate 
ramsi, arguing that it was dominated 
by Australia.
This triggered a tense diplomatic 
standoff between Australia and Solo-
mon Islands that eventually led to 
the declaration of Australian High 
Commissioner Patrick Cole as a 
persona non grata. He was accused 
of interfering in local politics and 
was expelled from Solomon Islands 
in September. This tension between 
the two countries dominated political 
discussions throughout 2006 and into 
2007, marking the lowest period, so 
far, in the history of diplomatic rela-
tions between Solomon Islands and 
Australia. 
To add salt to the wound, in 
December, Commissioner of Police 
Shane Castle (an Australian national), 
while on holiday in Australia, was 
declared an “undesirable immigrant” 
and banned from reentering Solomon 
Islands. Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Patterson Oti said that the decision 
was made “after long deliberations 
based on the Police Commissioner’s 
conduct on several instances, includ-
ing his role in the 2006 riots and the 
well-publicized raiding of the Prime 
Minister’s Offi ce” (Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet 2007). 
Throughout 2006, the diplomatic 
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row with Australia overshadowed 
Solomon Islands foreign relations in 
particular, and political discussions 
more generally. A new Australian high 
commissioner was not appointed until 
early 2007. Peter Hooton presented 
his credentials to Prime Minister Soga-
vare in March 2007, after waiting for 
almost two months to be received. 
The situation between Australia 
and Solomon Islands was exacerbated 
by the appointment of Julian Moti 
as attorney general, replacing Primo 
Afeau, who was sacked for opposing 
the terms of reference for the commis-
sion of enquiry on the riots. Moti, an 
Australian citizen, is a lawyer with a 
shady past. In 1997 he was charged 
for statutory rape in Vanuatu, but was 
later acquitted. Moti is close to Soga-
vare, with whom he shares a dislike 
of the Australian government and its 
policies in Solomon Islands. 
Not long after he was appointed 
attorney general, Canberra announced 
that Moti was wanted in Australia for 
the 1997 rape case in Vanuatu. This 
raised questions about Canberra’s 
motives: Why did the Australian 
authorities wait until now to charge 
him? Canberra’s action was seen as 
politically motivated — an attempt 
to ensure that Moti, who publicly 
expresses anti-Australian views, 
does not become attorney general 
and thereby exert more infl uence in 
Solomon Islands government policies 
toward Australia. 
In an interesting twist to the Moti 
saga, neighboring Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) was dragged into the diplo-
matic standoff with Australia after 
Moti escaped from Port Moresby 
while waiting for extradition to Aus-
tralia. In September he was arrested 
in Port Moresby by PNG and Aus-
tralian authorities. He appeared in a 
Port Moresby court, and was taken 
into custody while awaiting arrange-
ments to be extradited to Australia. In 
early October, however, Moti escaped 
to Solomon Islands on a clandestine 
PNG Defense Force fl ight. Canberra 
then lashed out at Port Moresby, 
banning PNG politicians from enter-
ing Australia. Allegations that people 
high in the PNG government assisted 
in Moti’s escape led to the establish-
ment of a commission of enquiry to 
look into Moti’s escape and how rules 
had been broken to facilitate it. The 
commission’s report pointed to wrongs 
committed as far up as the Prime 
Minister’s Offi ce. It put Prime Minis-
ter Sir Michael Somare in a diffi cult 
political situation. 
By October the Moti affair had set 
the stage for a standoff between the 
Melanesian countries and Australia at 
the Pacifi c Islands Forum meeting in 
Nadi, Fiji. Solomon Islands demanded 
a review of ramsi, with the objec-
tive of scaling down the Australian 
involvement. While the Forum agreed, 
nothing has yet been done. In the 
meantime, the diplomatic tension with 
Australia persists, although offi cials 
from the two countries have been 
working to mend relations. Australia 
has come to realize that dealing with 
its Melanesian neighbors will not be 
easy.
Politically, the Sogavare-led govern-
ment is united. But there is general 
public discontent in Solomon Islands 
over its poor diplomacy, especially in 
relation to Australia, whom many peo-
ple view as saving the Solomons from 
militant control. In particular, there is 
concern about the anti-ramsi rhetoric 
602 the contemporary pacifi c • 19:2 (2007)
and the threats to expel ramsi. Public 
dissatisfaction with the Sogavare-led 
government’s policies has been exacer-
bated by the government’s intention to 
rearm the Close Protection Unit of the 
Solomon Islands Police Force. Many 
Solomon Islanders still do not trust the 
police because of the involvements of 
some offi cers in criminal activities dur-
ing the civil unrest. 
All this negative publicity and poor 
diplomacy overshadowed the govern-
ment’s positive initiatives. The focus 
of its policy, for example, was on rural 
development—an attempt to involve 
the majority of people, who live in 
rural areas, in the development pro-
cess. Although this is not an entirely 
new initiative—the rhetoric has been 
used before by successive govern-
ments—the Sogavare-led government 
believed it could deliver development 
to rural people through its “Bottom 
Up Approach” strategy. In his speech 
marking the country’s twenty-eighth 
anniversary of independence, Prime 
Minister Sogavare pointed to the fact 
that Solomon Islanders had benefi ted 
only marginally from development 
in past years. He attributed this to 
the fact that Solomon Islanders never 
really participated in the development 
process. Consequently, he stated that 
his government was “determined to 
improve the active participation of 
Solomon Islanders in development by 
emphasising development at grassroots 
level” (Solomon Star, 10 July 2006). 
He said that development also depends 
on people allowing their resources 
to be used for development and the 
government to protect the rights of 
resource owners. By the end of 2006, 
a strategic plan had been drawn for 
the implementation of the “bottom-up 
approach.” The verdict on whether or 
not it succeeds will, however, come a 
few years down the road. 
The government’s rural develop-
ment focus is being supported by aid 
donors and international funding 
agencies. The World Bank, European 
Union, and AusAID, for example, 
have funded the Agriculture and Rural 
Development Strategy, which focuses 
on facilitating rural people’s participa-
tion in the cash economy. This will be 
implemented jointly by donors and the 
Ministry of Planning and Aid Coordi-
nation. 
In terms of economic develop-
ment, the economy is growing slowly. 
This is due to smallholder producers 
as well as the reopening of some of 
the major industries like the oil palm 
plantation in the Guadalcanal Plains. 
The plantation was abandoned by its 
former owner, the Solomon Islands 
Plantation Ltd (a subsidiary of the 
Commonwealth Development Corpo-
ration) during the height of the civil 
unrest. It has since been bought by 
the Guadalcanal Plains Palm Oil Ltd, 
a subsidiary of Kulim Bhd, a Malay-
sian-registered company that also has 
plantations in New Britain in neigh-
boring Papua New Guinea. It put a 
lot of money into the rehabilitation of 
the plantation, started production, and 
exported its fi rst crude oil to Europe 
in mid-2006. It has recruited over one 
thousand local workers to rehabilitate 
and reconstruct the plantation. 
By the end of 2006, negotiations for 
the establishment of another oil palm 
plantation in Auluta on Malaita Prov-
ince had been fi nalized and work on 
it is expected to begin in 2007. This 
is a major breakthrough, given that it 
would be the fi rst large-scale develop-
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ment on Malaita, the province with 
the largest population in the country.
In the meantime, the Gold Ridge 
gold mine, which had been destroyed 
during the civil unrest, was bought by 
an Australian consortium, the Austra-
lia Solomons Gold, and is expected 
to resume production by the end of 
2007. Work on rehabilitating the mine 
began in 2005.
So, while the diplomatic debacle 
between the Solomon Islands and 
Australian governments was going on, 
public servants and ordinary Solomon 
Islanders were hard at work trying to 
rebuild the economy and their own 
lives. It was, however, a diffi cult and 
uphill battle. Life for average Solomon 
Islanders has become more diffi cult 
because of the rapidly increasing cost 
of living (especially in urban areas) 
and the unavailability of or limited 
access to social services. Those who 
are employed fi nd that their income 
is often insuffi cient, and villagers 
have little or no access to sources of 
income generation. In January the 
national secretary of the Solomon 
Islands Council of Trade Unions, 
Tony Kagovai, acknowledged that in 
2006 many employees “would fi nd it 
diffi cult to meet their basic needs such 
as food, shelter, clothing and educa-
tion” (Solomon Star, 8 Jan 2006). As 
the year wore on, that became more 
evident and has contributed to social 
problems.
Law and order has improved 
signifi cantly since the deployment of 
ramsi because guns have been taken 
away from the communities. However, 
new challenges have emerged relating 
to increasing use of drugs like mari-
juana and home-brewed (and distilled) 
alcohol, known locally as kwaso. 
Despite police raids on kwaso produc-
tion, the problem persists, because for 
many people it is their only source of 
income. This has led to other prob-
lems, especially in the urban areas. 
ramsi continues to work with local 
authorities to address this. 
In the meantime police continued 
to investigate allegations of corruption 
among elite Solomon Islanders. Earlier 
there were concerns that ramsi had 
not arrested the “big fi sh”—politicians 
and public servants who were alleg-
edly emptying government coffers. 
Among those whom people pointed 
to was former Prime Minister Kema-
keza. In April, then Police Commis-
sioner Shane Castles told Radio New 
Zealand that Kemakeza was being 
investigated for allegations of fraud, 
following the tabling of a revealing 
audit report by the country’s auditor 
general. This is with regard to money 
missing from compensation payment 
when Kemakeza was the minister for 
National Unity and Reconciliation. 
It was alleged that more than us$5 
million went missing and that many 
of the compensation claims, which 
included one submitted by Kemak-
eza, were excessive and falsifi ed. In 
October, Kemakeza was arrested and 
charged with robbery, larceny, intimi-
dation, and demanding money with 
menaces. The charges relate to allega-
tions that Kemakeza had instructed 
former militants to intimidate and rob 
a legal fi rm, Sol-Law, in 2002 (rnzi 
2006). 
Another issue that featured promi-
nently in 2006 was the continuing 
debate about the relationship between 
Solomon Islands and the Republic 
of China (Taiwan) and how that has 
infl uenced domestic politics. In the 
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past, concerns had been expressed 
that Taiwanese aid had a negative 
impact because it was being used to 
fi nance certain politicians. In fact, in 
the lead-up to the April election Joses 
Tuhanuku alleged, “Taiwan’s dirty 
money comes fl ooding forward for the 
politician or candidate of the prime 
minister’s choice. . . . Now in the past 
few months leading up to the election, 
these Special Projects are being used as 
the chief source of campaign fund-
ing for the Prime Minister’s favorites 
whom are expected, once elected, to 
back him and his Republic of China 
cronies” (Solomon Star, 15 March 
2006).
Interestingly, when Sogavare came 
into power, he had indicated that he 
would reconsider the country’s rela-
tionship with Taiwan. But as Taiwan 
poured money into politicians’ slush 
fund, or the Rural Constituency Devel-
opment Fund, the government opted 
to stick with it. Taiwan has, over the 
years, provided important source 
of assistance to Solomon Islands 
and cannot be disposed of easily by 
politicians. The nature of Taiwanese 
involvement in Solomon Islands and 
the impact on the country’s domestic 
politics will continue to be an issue of 
debate in the future.
The political highlight of Decem-
ber was the provincial elections. In 
Malaita, the provincial premier in 
the previous assembly, Reuben Moli, 
lost his seat, while the Guadalcanal 
provincial election saw only four pro-
vincial members retaining their seats. 
Isabel and Western Provinces elected 
new premiers. The election results 
showed a desire for change of leader-
ship even at the provincial level.
The year was rounded off with the 
resignation of Deputy Prime Minister 
Job Dudley Tausinga. This followed 
disagreements between Tausinga and 
the prime minister over the “illegal 
shipment” of logs by a company that 
operated in Tausinga’s North New 
Georgia constituency. In an inter-
view with the Solomon Star (20 Dec 
2006), Tausinga said that he “had 
been forced to take the action I did 
because certain people were forcing 
me to apply a political solution to a 
legal issue. For me, that is wrong. You 
cannot continue to apply political 
solutions to legal issues.” But despite 
Tausinga’s resignation, the government 
remained strong.
By the end of December 2006, the 
political wheels turned more slowly. 
But the year had been packed with 
drama, especially in foreign relations. 
In terms of development issues, it 
seemed as though the government was 
saying the right things, at least rhetori-
cally, through its rural development 
focus. Whether or not these policies 
will succeed is yet to be seen. One 
thing is certain, even if the Sogavare-
led government dislikes Australia, they 
need Canberra’s assistance if they are 
to successfully implement their poli-
cies and drag Solomon Islands out of 
the problems left behind by the civil 
unrest. 
tarcisius tara kabutaulaka, 
louisa kabutaulaka
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Vanuatu
Perceived lack of government action 
on various issues and indecisiveness or 
lack of coordination within the gov-
erning coalition led to three proposed 
motions of no confi dence against 
Prime Minister Ham Lini during 2006. 
While Lini survived all of these chal-
lenges, the price of the government’s 
survival was high. Large pay increases 
were awarded to public servants and 
police, while the Vanuatu Commodi-
ties Marketing Board (vcmb) declared 
price increases for the purchase of 
copra and kava.
The Lini-led coalition government 
was fi rst established in December 
2004. Throughout 2005 there were 
several changes to the coalition. By 
February 2006 the government con-
sisted of eight political parties, includ-
ing the National United Party (nup) 
and the Vanua‘aku Party (vp); People’s 
Progressive Party (ppp); National 
Community Association Party (ncap); 
Melanesian Progressive Party (mpp); 
Vanuatu Republican Party (vrp); 
People’s Action Party (pap); and two 
backbenchers from the Union of 
Moderate Parties (ump) (PVPO, 2 Feb 
2006).
The fi rst major challenge the gov-
ernment faced in 2006 was a motion 
of no confi dence in March. By early 
March all the Green Confederation 
(gc) members of Parliament and the 
Melanesian Progressive Party had 
left the governing coalition. These 
two parties, along with the Union of 
Moderate Parties, formed an opposi-
tion bloc that supported Sela Molisa 
as the new prime minister (PVPO, 21 
March 2006). Although politics in 
Vanuatu frequently appears to be 
dominated by personalities rather than 
policies, in this instance there were 
clear policy motives for the proposed 
motion. They included “the delay in 
appointing a police commissioner (for 
more than 18 months), [the failure to 
resolve] Air Vanuatu / Vanair’s strike 
and the Vanuatu Commodities Mar-
keting Board (vcmb) saga [relating 
to listing kava as a prescribed com-
modity]” (PVPO, 14 March 2006). 
Other issues included “unresolved 
issues such as unsuccessful motions of 
non confi dences that cost a lot to the 
people of Vanuatu, illegal terminations 
from the government . . . high school 
fees, the issue of the two new Chinese 
donated ships awaiting routes, the late 
start to operations of Pekoa Interna-
tional Airport and the court case of 
the termination of the former chief 
executive offi cer of Air Vanuatu that is 
costing millions of vatu in compensa-
tion” (PVPO, 21 Feb 2006). Underlying 
all of these issues was the perception 
that the Lini-led government was 
indecisive or unable to make decisions 
when needed. This is at least in part 
due to the need to gain agreement of 
all members of the coalition before 
decisions can be made.
There were some legal maneuver-
ings prior to parliamentary debate 
on the motion of no confi dence, with 
the government proposing a coun-
ter motion to censure the members 
involved. This was ruled to be uncon-
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stitutional (VDP, 18 March 2006) on 
the grounds that “A motion of no 
confi dence is not serious misconduct 
within the standing orders of the 
parliament and a member cannot be 
suspended or disciplined for fi ling, 
signing or supporting a motion of no 
confi dence against the prime minis-
ter of the republic” (PVPO, 29 March 
2006). The motion of no confi dence 
failed, largely because kava was taken 
off the list of prescribed commodities 
the day before the motion was debated 
in Parliament, and this was one of the 
main policy changes that the oppo-
sition was seeking (VDP, 20 March 
2006).
In May, kava was relisted as a pre-
scribed commodity, and in early June 
there was talk that another motion 
of no confi dence would be lodged, 
although this did not ultimately even-
tuate (PVPO, 3 Aug 2006). A 20–25 
percent pay increase for civil servants 
that was paid from early August 
helped to ensure that support for the 
Lini government was maintained. 
There had reportedly been no review 
of public servant pay scales in ten 
years, so an upward adjustment was 
warranted, but such a large increase 
will be diffi cult to cover (IB, Jan 2007).
The fi nal motion of no confi dence 
for 2006 was lodged on 8 December. 
In response, the government increased 
the Vanuatu Commodities Market-
ing Board’s copra purchasing price 
to 31,000 vatu per ton (VDP, 15 Dec 
2006). (During 2006, one US dollar 
averaged 108 vatu.) This increase, 
which benefi ts rural communities and 
therefore strengthens the position of 
government members of Parliament, 
ensured that no members would cross 
the fl oor and support the motion 
of no confi dence. Additionally, the 
Parliament (Members’ Expenses and 
Allowances) (Amendment) Act 2006 
was passed in the fi nal session of Par-
liament. This act (which was seen as 
giving in to government backbenchers’ 
demands for an increase in allowances 
in order to prevent any of them from 
crossing the fl oor) increased monthly 
traveling allowances from 34,000 vatu 
to 70,000 vatu. The motion therefore 
lost support and was withdrawn (VDP, 
16 Dec 2006).
Of the policy issues underpinning 
the various no confi dence motions, 
three are particularly noteworthy: the 
lack of action over the appointment 
of a police commissioner; instability 
within Air Vanuatu; and questions as 
to the future role of the Vanuatu Com-
modities Marketing Board, particu-
larly in relation to the export of kava.
Issues relating to the police commis-
sioner and Air Vanuatu were detailed 
in the 2005 Vanuatu political review. 
The position of police commissioner 
had been fi lled by an acting commis-
sioner since September 2004, when 
Robert Diniro Obed lost his position 
after being involved in an attempted 
arrest of then Prime Minister Serge 
Vohor. The lack of leadership led to 
dissatisfaction within the police force, 
and the government was subject to 
much criticism over being slow to act 
in the appointment of a new police 
commissioner. The situation was 
resolved in August with the appoint-
ment of Lieutenant Colonel Patu 
Lui of the Vanuatu Mobile Force. In 
addition to resolving issues relating to 
leadership, other causes of dissatisfac-
tion within the police force, including 
low pay and lack of incentives, were 
also addressed. In April police claims 
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for underpayment of salaries from 
1998–2004 were settled (VDP, 8 April 
2006), and in August the remain-
der of the underpayment claim was 
resolved (PVPO, 14 Aug 2006). The 
Government Remuneration Tribunal 
determination of police salaries was 
fi nalized in December, and police sala-
ries increased from 1 January 2007. 
There was also some restructuring of 
the police force, with a new Depart-
ment of Correctional Services being 
established to look after the running 
of prisons (Correctional Services Act 
2006), and in November, thirty new 
police recruits began training (VDP, 21 
November 2006). This was the fi rst 
intake of new recruits to the police 
force in seven years.
Strike actions in relation to Air 
Vanuatu escalated toward the end of 
2005, when some staff were laid off. 
Airline management stated that their 
terminations were part of an ongo-
ing restructure and that the termina-
tions were legal. In December 2005, 
forty-eight Vanuatu National Workers 
Union (vnwu) members were arrested 
and charged with a variety of offenses 
in relation to unlawful picketing. The 
government later endorsed the Air 
Vanuatu Board’s decision to terminate 
various staff (VDP, 6 Jan 2006). The 
union was obviously unhappy with the 
arrest of some of its members, and in 
January 2006 this group fi led in court, 
claiming that their constitutional 
rights had been breached, although 
this claim did not succeed (VDP, 4 
Jan 2006). Other vnwu workers 
then began to raise grievances, with 
representatives of Unelco, Vanuatu’s 
only power company, issuing a notice 
of a strike action. One of the reasons 
for this was that one of their staff 
members had been suspended for 
participating in 2005 in a solidarity 
action staged to support Air Vanuatu 
workers. The matter went to media-
tion on 27 January 2006 and was 
ultimately solved through arbitration 
without any disruption of services. 
Vanuatu Abattoirs Ltd (val) had also 
been the subject of disputes in 2005, 
and another signifi cant “union action” 
(which was not offi cially authorized 
by the vnwu) was the taking hostage 
of the abattoir manager and some 
overseas workers who had been 
brought in to update the computer 
system. While no one was harmed in 
the incident, the workers had come 
armed with bush knives and steel rods. 
The val manager had previously been 
the subject of death threats, which 
added to the gravity of the incident 
(tvnz, 25 Feb 2006; VDP, 1 March 
2006). The threat of major disruptions 
by the union then gradually quieted 
down, with the Labour Department 
continuing to work with all parties to 
resolve disputes through arbitration. 
By September, when at least twenty 
vnwu workers were found guilty of 
various crimes in relation to the illegal 
strike action of December 2005, very 
little attention was given to the judg-
ment (VDP, 18 Sept 2006).
Concerns about the fi nancial situ-
ation of Air Vanuatu continue to be 
raised, although management main-
tains that the merger of Air Vanuatu 
and Vanair is responsible for creat-
ing many of the fi nancial diffi culties, 
and that the airline is being managed 
appropriately and the debts it owes 
are gradually being repaid (VDP, 31 
Aug, 4 Dec 2006).
The Vanuatu Commodities Market-
ing Board, which regulates various 
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agricultural products, has not recently 
been discussed in this journal’s 
Vanuatu political reviews. However, 
it is also no stranger to scandal, and 
in the 1990s it had been the subject 
of several ombudsman reports. The 
reports examined alleged misappro-
priation and mismanagement by vcmb 
members and agents, and political 
interference in the appointment of the 
board. In 2005, following its de-pre-
scription in 1997, kava was relisted as 
a prescribed commodity. In January, 
the marketing board declared that 
no one could export kava without a 
license and that no licenses would be 
issued to private individuals—essen-
tially giving the board a monopoly 
over kava. The obligation for inspect-
ing kava exports also appeared to 
shift from the Vanuatu Quarantine 
Inspection Service to the marketing 
board, raising concerns about qual-
ity controls on the export of kava. 
This soon raised questions in relation 
to Vanuatu’s obligation under the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group agree-
ment and the Pacifi c Island Countries 
Trade Agreement, as intensifi ed trade 
or export restrictions are prohibited 
under both agreements (VDP, 24 Jan 
2006). Private sector operators were 
also obviously troubled. Despite 
fi gures demonstrating a boom in kava 
exports after kava was taken off the 
list of prescribed commodities in 1997 
(VDP, 25 Feb 2006), the government 
maintained that the policy would be in 
the best interest of kava growers as, by 
forming cooperatives, they could “fi x 
the price of these valuable commodi-
ties with the buyer” (PVPO, 28 Feb 
2006). However, the media reported 
that some farmers claimed they 
received better prices for their kava 
from exporters than from the Vanuatu 
Commodities Marketing Board (PVPO, 
28 Feb 2006). This issue looked set to 
topple the Lini government in March, 
so kava was again removed from the 
prescribed commodities list, but as 
soon as the immediate crisis was over, 
kava was again listed (Order 14 of 
2006; gazetted 8 May 2006), and the 
vcmb purchase price for dried kava 
set at 1,000 vatu per kilogram (VDP, 
25 May 2006). Exporters were given 
until 20 May to export any stock, and 
were told that they might forfeit any 
stock they attempted to export after 
that date (VDP, 30 May 2006).
The kava dispute began to affect 
New Caledonia as well, after the 
marketing board signed an agreement 
with Maison du Vanuatu to be the sole 
importer and distributor of Vanuatu 
kava in New Caledonia. By July 2006 
there were reports that kava dealers in 
Vanuatu were picketing the Vanuatu 
Consular Offi ce in Nouméa over the 
agreement with Maison du Vanuatu 
and shortages in the supply of kava 
(VDP, 6 July 2006). Although the gov-
ernment committed itself to reviewing 
the position in respect of Maison du 
Vanuatu (VDP, 13 July 2006), by the 
end of the year Maison du Vanuatu 
remained the sole importer of Vanu-
atu kava into Nouméa (VDP, 28 Nov 
2006). Issues relating to the export 
of kava, and more generally what the 
vcmb role should be in relation to 
prescribed commodities, are far from 
resolved, and can expect to continue 
into 2007.
There were a number of other 
recurring issues in 2006. As in 2005, 
diffi culties in local government struc-
tures were apparent. In 2005 the main 
focus was on the Port Vila Municipal 
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Council, and allegations of corruption 
and mismanagement within it. In 2006 
it was the Luganville Municipal Coun-
cil that was in the spotlight. Again 
there were allegations of mismanage-
ment and abuse of public funds, and 
problems due to outstanding debts. 
In January, Minister of Internal 
Affairs George Wells gave the council 
two months to sort out its fi nancial 
situation, warning that if issues were 
not resolved, the council would be 
suspended (VDP, 14 Jan 2006). The 
council was fi nally suspended in late 
November, with the minister stating 
that he deliberately let matters “hit 
rock bottom before deciding yet again 
to suspend it to prove to the courts 
that his decision is not biased” (VDP, 
11 Dec 2006). Wells had attempted 
to suspend the Luganville Municipal 
Council in 2005, but the courts had 
not allowed this suspension to stand.
The Sanma Provincial Council also 
continued to fi nd itself in trouble. In 
August the principal electoral offi cer 
sent a paper to the Council of Min-
isters recommending the dissolution 
of this council, as half of its members 
had been absent from more than 
three consecutive meetings (VDP, 2 
Sept 2006). These absences were not 
the only matters that prompted the 
ultimate dissolution of the Sanma 
Provincial Council; there were also 
allegations of mismanagement and 
corruption. Interference by the Sanma 
Provincial Council and the Penama 
Provincial Council in the running of 
the Northern Island Stevedoring Com-
pany Ltd was a particular issue, with 
an audit of the company showing that 
more than 46 million vatu had been 
misused (VDP, 10 June, 12 July 2006).
Another theme in public debate 
in 2006 was land. Land in Vanuatu 
is owned by the custom owners, but 
can be leased, thus enabling others 
to “own” land for the duration of 
the lease and to potentially trade that 
lease. Increasingly, land on Efate, par-
ticularly coastal land, has been leased, 
and the boom in real estate develop-
ment has generated many concerns, 
including that unscrupulous land deal-
ers might not give custom owners a 
fair price for the lease; that lease terms 
might require the leaseholder to be 
compensated for improvements when 
the lease expires, but custom owners 
might not have the money to pay the 
compensation; and that people are los-
ing customary access to the shore and 
reefs. In early 2006, it was reported 
that the prime minister “received a 
petition from chiefs demanding the 
government ban all sale(s) of indig-
enous land” (VDP, 4 Jan 2006). In Sep-
tember, Vanuatu held a National Land 
Summit. It was reported that there 
were over 1,000 recommendations 
from this summit, but 20 resolutions 
were fi nalized (VDP, 30 Sept 2006). 
These resolutions covered a range of 
matters, including the need to review 
laws relating to determining the true 
custom owner of the land; to review 
land lease conditions; to have leases 
in Bislama and to take more steps to 
ensure the true consent of the custom 
owners; to regulate real estate agents 
through mechanisms such as a code 
of fair practice; to revise land rents; to 
incorporate social impact assessments 
into any proposed new leases; to 
ensure public access to beaches, rivers, 
and lakes is guaranteed; and to create 
a national subdivision policy.
The National Land Summit has 
not quelled all land disputes in Port 
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Vila. In October a group from Ton-
goa calling itself the Vete Association 
went around spray painting on various 
buildings that they were claimed by 
the association. While the targeted 
buildings have mainly been unoc-
cupied government buildings, some 
private homes were also marked (VDP, 
30 Oct 2006; PVPO, 6 Dec 2006). 
The dissatisfaction of people from 
Tongoa is at least in part prompted 
by the handling of a sublease of land 
by the Port Vila marketplace that 
was made by Ifi ra Land Trustees to 
a private company. Chiefs of Tongoa 
who thought they had at least some 
claim to the land placed namele leaves 
(cycad palm leaves) signifying a cus-
tom ban on the site in March, only to 
have these leaves thrown into the sea 
by an offi cer of Ifi ra Land Trustees. 
This action, which indicated consider-
able disrespect for custom, created 
an angry response, with people from 
Tongoa cutting the fence around the 
site and attempting to disturb work 
there (VDP, 27 May, 30 May 2006). 
By the end of 2006 little development 
had taken place on this site and it is 
unclear whether any resolution as to 
its future has been reached.
Santo has also been the location of 
disputes related to land. In late July 
there were security concerns in Lugan-
ville as violence, largely directed at a 
family from Paama, broke out. Initial 
reports suggested that disputes related 
to the Northern Island Stevedoring 
Company Ltd, but it soon became 
apparent that the underlying issue was 
the existence of a memorandum of 
understanding to establish a free trade 
zone in Santo (VDP, 4 Aug 2006). This 
memorandum was between Max-
ime Carlot Korman as the Vanuatu 
government’s representative and a 
US-based investment group (VDP, 28 
Aug 2006). It was also signed “on 
behalf of the landowners” by a man 
from Ambrym and a man from Paama 
(VDP, 9 Aug 2006). This created anger 
among the actual landowners in 
Santo, both because the true cus-
tom owners were not consulted, and 
because the free trade zone proposal 
involves the creation of freehold land 
(VDP, 28 Aug 2006). The Council of 
Ministers has approved, in principle, 
a study into the costs and benefi ts of 
a free trade zone in the Big Bay area 
of Santo (VDP, 17 Aug 2006). Given 
the way the memorandum of under-
standing is worded, the free trade zone 
“may have internally applicable laws, 
local government, freedom of offi cial 
currency selection, immigration, pass-
ports etc.”—so it would essentially 
become an autonomous state (VDP, 
28Aug 2006). It is not the fi rst time 
that such an idea has been raised, with 
the Santo Rebellion in 1980 having 
similar roots. More recently, a similar 
memorandum was signed in 1999 
between government offi cials and the 
Mondragon Group. It is interesting 
to note that Michael Oliver, who was 
instrumental in the Santo rebellion, 
was also found to be behind the Mon-
dragon Group’s proposals (Ombuds-
man’s Offi ce 2001). It is not clear at 
this point exactly who is driving the 
latest free trade zone proposal.
A land issue that could be very 
costly for the government was the dis-
pute over the development of Kakula 
Island Resort. The development was 
approved in 2001, and in 2004, fol-
lowing a request by the Environment 
Unit, an environmental impact assess-
ment statement was submitted. The 
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director of the Environment Unit then 
stopped the development for reasons 
that are unclear, and made a number 
of defamatory statements to a meeting 
of Efate chiefs. Kakula Island Resorts 
Ltd then sued both the government 
and the director of the Environment 
Unit personally for damages, for tres-
pass, negligence, injurious falsehood, 
defamation and breach of confi dence, 
and general damages and exemplary 
damages. The Supreme Court ruled 
in favor of Kakula Island Resorts 
Ltd and ordered the government to 
pay 745,316,344 vatu in damages. 
The director of the Environment Unit 
was ordered to pay 7,000,000 vatu 
personally, due to his actions (Kakula 
Island Resorts Ltd v Government of 
the Republic of Vanuatu [2006] vusc 
33). While this decision could poten-
tially add further strain to govern-
ment fi nances, it is reportedly being 
appealed (adb 2006, 10).
Tourist ships gave rise to a number 
of incidents in 2006. The fi rst relates 
to dissatisfaction on the part of bus 
and taxi drivers over a local company, 
Adventures in Paradise, being the sole 
tour operator. In February ongoing 
resentments resulted in a number of 
assaults on Adventures in Paradise 
staff, and p&o Cruises threatened to 
cancel all cruise ships, although this 
was soon reversed after police guaran-
teed that they would have a presence 
at the wharf in order to keep the peace 
(VDP, 16 Feb, 18 Feb 2006). Similar 
incidents occurred in May, when pas-
sengers on a National Geographic ves-
sel could not leave the wharf on their 
prepaid organized tours due to tour 
buses being blocked by angry bus and 
taxi drivers who felt they had wasted 
their time waiting for potential passen-
gers. Vanuatu has now been removed 
as a destination for the National 
Geographic tours (VDP, 29 May 2006). 
The potential damage to tourism and 
retail businesses in Port Vila if inci-
dents like these recur is something of a 
concern, as the cruise ships provide a 
valuable source of customers.
p&o found itself in trouble toward 
the end of 2006, when it was found 
that they had dumped oil from one of 
their cruise ships into the Etas land-
fi ll, located on the outskirts of Port 
Vila (VDP, 17 Oct 2006). There are 
no facilities in Vanuatu to properly 
process waste oil, and the dumping 
has resulted in the need for an oil-
spill cleanup operation. At the time of 
writing it appears that the cleanup has 
been effective but it is not clear who 
authorized this oil dumping to take 
place.
Another incident of violence marred 
the end of the year, with members 
of the Vanuatu Fisherman’s Associa-
tion—who were allegedly unhappy 
with slow payment of outstanding 
money from Taiwanese ventures they 
had worked with—“kidnapping” a 
partner from the accounting fi rm that 
was handling the funds (VDP, 12 Dec 
2006). Several days later, the newly 
appointed president of the fi shermen’s 
association was shot in the leg when 
members had gathered outside the 
Port Vila Courthouse for a court hear-
ing (VDP, 18 Dec 2006).
The apparently increasing trend 
toward expressing frustrations 
through violence is worrying, but 
two developments in 2006 may help 
to alleviate tensions. First, the initial 
payment from the Millennium Chal-
lenge Account (mca) was received by 
Vanuatu. mca projects will commence 
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in 2007, leading to more jobs and 
improved infrastructure. Second, while 
the Australian government has not 
been willing to consider allowing tem-
porary workers from Vanuatu or other 
Pacifi c Islands entrance to Australia, 
the New Zealand government estab-
lished a seasonal workers scheme for 
Vanuatu citizens in late 2006 (VDP, 20 
April 2006). People under this scheme 
are engaged in fruit picking, an area 
in which New Zealand suffers labor 
shortages. Initial reports indicate that 
the scheme is working successfully, 
and it is hoped that the work oppor-
tunities and remittances generated by 
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